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2“That which one man has invented, all the world can imitate. Without the 
assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost always be driven out of the 
market by his rivals, who finding himself, without any expense, in possession of a 
discovery which has cost the inventor much time and expense, would be able to 
deprive him of all his deserved advantages, by selling at a lower price.”
- Jeremy Bentham1
“Maintaining monopolies for medicine for poor countries during a worldwide 
health catastrophe is unethical and immoral”2
- Paul Davis, Health GAP Coalition
I. INTRODUCTION
The AIDS epidemic turned the world’s attention to the problem of high drug 
prices in developing countries and the numerous barriers to access to essential drugs in 
these countries. The AIDS epidemic also triggered an extensive debate on the 
relationship between patents,3 global trade agreements, particularly the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS Agreement”)4, and public health 
1
 JEREMY BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 71 (1839).
2
 Paul Davis is a spokesperson for Health Gap, an organization of U.S.-based AIDS and human rights 
activists who campaign against policies that deny treatment to millions and increase the spread of HIV.  See
http://www.healthgap.org/hgap/about.html.
3
 A patent can be simply defined as “an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a 
process that provides a new way of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A 
patent provides protection for the invention to the owner of the patent. The protection is granted for a 
limited period, generally 20 years.” See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Inventions 
(Patents), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/patents.html. 
4 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 33 I.L.M. 81, 108 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
The TRIPS Agreement is arguably one of the most controversial of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements and has been the subject of numerous articles and commentaries. See generally, Frederick M. 
Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crisis: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER 
L. SYMP. J. 71 (2001); Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
859 (2002); ROBERT L. OSTERGARD, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (2003); Haochen Sun, A Wider Access 
to Patented Drugs Under the TRIPS Agreement, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101 (2003).
3and raised important questions about the role of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)5
in promoting access to medicine in developing countries. Before November 2001, the 
core questions were: whether the TRIPS Agreement retarded access to essential medicine 
in developing countries by raising the cost of patented pharmaceuticals,6 whether 
compulsory licensing in developing countries was needed to address the problem of 
access in these countries, and whether the TRIPS Agreement permitted countries to resort 
to compulsory license to address public health problems.7
 At the 2001 Ministerial Conference8 in Doha, Qatar, WTO Members adopted the 
“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (“Doha Declaration”).9 The 
Doha Declaration was groundbreaking in the sense that it appeared to unequivocally 
recognize the primacy of public health over commercial interests.10 The Declaration 
answered in the affirmative the question whether WTO Member States can resort to 
compulsory licensing to address a public health crisis. However, the Declaration left one 
5
 The WTO is an organization established in 1994 to provide a common institutional framework for the 
conduct of trade relations among Member States. One of the basic functions of the WTO is to facilitate the 
implementation, administration and operation of multilateral trade agreements. See Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (Marrakesh, April 15, 
1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144  [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
6
 Bibek Debroy, TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate, The Compulsory License Anomaly (July 
2001), available at http://www.policynetwork.net/print/debroy.htm. 
7
 When a government grants compulsory license, the patent holder retains intellectual property rights and is 
generally entitled to an adequate remuneration. In the pharmaceutical sector, a generic drug is a 
bioequivalent of a patented drug and is usually intended to be used interchangeably with the original 
patented drug. A generic drug is not produced under a patent. Under most domestic patent law, 
governments can issue compulsory license to allow a competitor to produce a patented product or process 
under license and subject to conditions aimed to safeguarding the legitimate interests of the patent owner.
8
 The Ministerial Conference is the highest forum in the structure of the WTO. The Ministerial Conference 
is composed of representatives of all the WTO Members and meets at least once every two years. Since the 
establishment of the WTO, the Ministerial Conference has been held five times: Singapore (December 
1996), Geneva (May 1998), Seattle (November – December 1999), Doha (November 2001), and Cancun 
(September 2003).
9
 The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on November 14, 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (November 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ thewto_e/ 
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
10
 Sun, supra note 4, at 104 (noting that the Doha Declaration “marked a turning point for political and 
legal relations at the WTO.”).
4thorny question unresolved, the question whether WTO Members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector and who are thus unable to make 
use of compulsory licensing can import generic drugs manufactured under compulsory 
license from other countries (the so-called Paragraph 6 question). 
Between November 2001 and September 2003, fresh debates ensued over the 
Paragraph 6 question. To allay the fears of developing countries, two decisions were 
made by the TRIPS Council and the General Council respectively in 2002. On June 27, 
2002, the Council on TRIPS, acting under paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration, made a 
decision to grant the least-developed country Members of the WTO an extension on the 
time within which they have to comply with some of the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.11  On July 8, 2002, the General Council adopted a decision waiving the 
obligation of least developed countries (“LDC’s”) under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS 
Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products.12 Finally, on August 30, 2003, at a 
11 Decision on the Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-
Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision 
of the Council for TRIPS of June 27, 2002, PRESS/301 (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres02_e/pr301_e.htm [hereinafter Extension Decision 1].  
Paragraph 1 of the decision states: “Least-developed country Members will not be obliged, with 
respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS 
Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016.” Paragraph 2 
provides that, “[t]his decision is made without prejudice to the right of least-developed country Members to 
seek other extensions of the period provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement.”
On the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, all WTO Members except developing countries and 
least-developed countries had one year after the entry into force of the Agreement to comply with the 
provisions of the Agreement. Except for obligations relating to national treatment and most-favored nation 
which became applicable after the expiration of one year, developing countries received an additional 
transition period of four years. Under paragraph 1 of Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement, least-developed 
countries had received a ten-year extension on the date stipulated for WTO Members to implement the 
TRIPS Agreement. This meant that they were not expected to implement most provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement until 2005. With the June 27, 2002, Decision of the Council for TRIPS, the least developed 
countries do not have to implement the TRIPS Agreement until 2016.  
12 Least-Developed Country Members — Obligations Under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with 
Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of July 8, 2002, available at
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr301_e.htm [hereinafter Extension Decision 2].  
Paragraph 1 states that “[t]he obligations of least-developed country Members under paragraph 9 
of Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products until 
5meeting of the WTO General Council13 world trade ministers adopted the Decision on the 
Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (“2003 Decision on Implementation” or “Decision”)14 that appears to 
finally lay to rest the lingering questions regarding the relationship between patent rights, 
the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicine.
The different battles over the relationship between patents and public health now 
appear to be over. This article takes a close look at the battlefield more than three years 
after the war began. It is an attempt to access gains and map progress. In this paper, I 
argue that although the several battles over access may have ended, determining what 
exactly has been achieved and forecasting the potential impact of the Doha Declaration 
and the 2003 Decision on Implementation on access to medicine in developing countries 
may not be easy. It may therefore be a long time before the suffering masses in the Third 
World derive any tangible benefit from the two texts. There are several reasons for this. 
First, both the Doha Declaration and 2003 Decision on Implementation have major 
loopholes that could still be used to curtail the rights of developing countries in the 
future. Second, for countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, the 2003 
1 January 2016.”   Paragraph 2 states that “[t]his waiver shall be reviewed by the Ministerial Conference 
not later than one year after it is granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver terminates, in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement.” 
Article 70(9) provides: “[W]here a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in 
accordance with paragraph 8(a), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstanding the provisions 
of Part VI, for a period of five years after obtaining marketing approval in that Member or until a product 
patent is granted or rejected in that Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed and a patent granted for that 
product in another Member and marketing approval obtained in such other Member.” 
13 The WTO General Council is composed of representatives of all the Member States. The General 
Council meets as appropriate and conducts the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the intervals 
between meetings of the latter. See WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Article IV.2.
14 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Decision of the General Council of August 30, 2003, WT/L/540 (September 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm [hereinafter 2003 Decision on 
Implementation].
6Decision of Implementation contains conditions that are somewhat burdensome and that 
could discourage the emergence of a robust generic industry in needed pharmaceuticals.   
Third, it is doubtful that developing countries will begin to grant compulsory license as 
envisaged in the two texts. For one thing, developed countries could still use covert 
threats of economic sanctions and other forms of political pressure to compel developing 
countries to respect the intellectual property rights (“IPR’s”) of patent holders.  In 
addition, quite apart from political pressures from developed countries, the reality is that 
“[f]ew compulsory licenses have ever been granted in developing countries.”15
The most important but hitherto overlooked problems, however, are the problems 
of abuse of patent rights and anticompetitive practices by pharmaceutical companies and 
the absence of comprehensive rules at the global level to address these problems. In the 
United States (“U.S.”), brand-name pharmaceutical companies, in their attempt to 
maintain their dominant market share, are increasingly resorting to a host of abusive and 
anticompetitive practices.  Despite the existence of strong antitrust laws in the U.S. and a 
multitude of laws and regulations directed at protecting U.S. consumers from false 
business practices, pharmaceutical companies find ingenious ways to evade the law and 
prey on vulnerable consumers. A study of unfolding law suits in the United States teaches 
that in the absence of strong antitrust rules at the domestic level and a multilateral 
agreement on competition law at the global level, pharmaceutical companies will find 
ways to avoid the consequences of the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on 
Implementation. In other words, the nature of competition in the pharmaceutical industry 
and the capacity of states and/or the WTO to regulate competition in the industry may 
15
 JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 382 
(2001). 
7ultimately determine the overall effect the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on 
Implementation will have on access to medicine in poor countries absent the development 
of a strong ethical code of conduct to guide practices in the pharmaceutical industry. 
In pursuing my argument, I examine and attempt to draw lessons from the present 
war against abuse of patent rights and anti-competitive practices in the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. The U.S. experience suggests that in the absence of strong 
public and private oversight, a host of abuses are possible in the pharmaceutical industry. 
One such abuse is in the form of collusive settlement agreements between brand name 
drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers that have the effect of delaying the 
entry of generic drugs into the market. These cases suggest the need, beyond well-
intended legal solutions, for public oversight and vigilance by consumer groups and non-
governmental organizations. 
Undoubtedly, there are strong and compelling reasons why IPR’s must be 
respected and accorded maximum protection; there are, however, other values worth 
protecting besides intellectual property rights.  IPR’s operate as an incentive for the 
development of new and useful technology, including pharmaceuticals.16 IPR’s, 
particularly patents, are important to the pharmaceutical industry for two reasons. First, 
frequently the industry has to invest considerable amount of time and resources into 
researching and developing new drugs.17 Second, “pharmaceuticals are generally 
relatively easy to reverse-engineer and thus are open to easy copying in the absence of … 
16
 Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface 
Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 363,  
372 (2000) (“There exists an important relationship between a strong patent regime and Research and 
Development ….”).  
17 Id. at 373 (observing that research into new drugs is risky, expensive and time consuming).
8protection.”18 For developing countries, the protection of IPR’s can also encourage the 
transfer of technology from developed countries.19 Because IPR’s are commercial rights 
essentially driven towards economic gains,20 they can and do frequently affect the 
welfare of the general public. This means that when IPR’s are discussed, the emphasis 
must not be exclusively on the rights of producers of intellectual property (“IP”), 
particularly patent holders. Rather, IPR’s must be discussed and examined also from the 
perspective of consumers and the general welfare of a nation.21
Overall, I conclude that the battle over access to medicine was not a waste. It is 
necessary that the WTO clarify the flexibilities countries enjoy under the TRIPS 
Agreement to address their domestic problems. Even if developing countries do not fully 
exercise their right to grant compulsory license in the future, the existence of such a right 
can function as a powerful weapon for bargaining lower prices from brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies.22 Compulsory license can be a solution to the problem of 
patent exclusivity; it is frequently used to remedy certain antitrust violations involving 
IPR’s. However, compulsory licenses can also trigger or encourage a range of abusive 
practices in the pharmaceutical industry as affected companies struggle to maintain their 
market share and dominant position. 
The debate over access to medicine underscored the fact that there are obvious 
political, social, economic and policy implications when states decide to adopt strong 
18 Id.
19Id. at 364 (arguing that “a strong patent protection regime has a net global social gain, as well as a net 
social gain to developing countries”).
20 Id.
21
 OSTERGARD, JR., supra note 4, at 12.
22
 As a result of threat by the Brazilian government to issue a compulsory license, Roche, the Swiss 
pharmaceutical company, agreed to a substantial price cut for Nelfinavir, a patented AIDS drug.  See
DUNCAN MATTHEWS , GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 115
(2002). 
9intellectual property protection,23 and the fact that “all states are not equal in their level of 
political and economic development”24 – something that was ignored during the 
negotiations that produced the TRIPS Agreement.25 The TRIPS Agreement was the 
product of aggressive negotiation by developed countries governments and “bound all 
signatory states to implementing a full Western-style IP regime.”26 Unwittingly, 
developing countries signed on to the TRIPS Agreement largely as a result of intense 
pressure from developed countries but without addressing the potential social and 
economic costs of their action.27
In the final analysis, the pharmaceutical industry cannot be the enemy for three 
reasons. First, the battle over access to medicine arose primarily because medicines are 
essential goods and yet their production does require substantial and very expensive 
technological in-put. The nature of drugs inevitably means that pharmaceutical 
companies have a unique type of financial and social responsibility – they provide 
important public goods.28 Second, although WTO Members now appear to have the 
freedom to issue compulsory license to address their health problems, the cooperation of 
23
 OSTERGARD, JR., supra note 4, at 2 (observing that states do not adopt strong intellectual property rights 
policies as a matter of rationale economic policy only, but also as a matter of rationale political policy).
24 Id. at 3.
25 Id. at 7 (observing that the US argued forcefully that there were international benefits to be derived from 
global protection of intellectual property rights without regard for where countries were in their 
development process).
26
 OSTERGARD, JR., supra note 4, at 1  (observing that the TRIPS Agreement was a result, in part, of the 
strong lobbying effort by the United States). Developed countries were the strongest proponents of the 
TRIPS Agreement because of changes in their industrial base and the rise of intense global competition. 
Essentially, as the comparative advantage of Western nations shifted from agricultural products and 
manufacturing to sectors that require high technological in-put, these countries became anxious to see 
intellectual property rights globalized . Id. at 7.
27 Id. at 7 (noting that the United States pressured governments of developing countries into accepting 
stringent intellectual property rights regulation).
28
 Anna Thomas, Street Price: A Global Approach to Drug Pricing for Developing Countries 5, a Position 
Paper for the Voluntary Service Organization or “VSO” (Ken Bluestone et al eds.), available at 
http://vso.org.uk/publications/positionpapers/pdfs/street_price.pdf.  See also Singham, supra note 16, at 
365 (noting that patents enable the industry to provide a very important public good).
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patent holders will still be crucial for countries to obtain the technology needed to 
effectively work the patent. Third, given my predictions that it is not likely that many 
developing countries will actually issue compulsory licenses in the future, countries may 
still have to rely on the goodwill of pharmaceutical companies to meet their 
pharmaceutical needs through alternative channels.  
This paper is in five sections. Section II offers a background to the Multilateral 
Trading System (“MTS”), the TRIPS Agreement, and the compulsory licensing debate as 
it has unfolded since the explosion of the AIDS epidemic. Section III introduces the 
reader to the 2003 Decision on Implementation and highlights the main provisions of the 
Decision. In Section IV, I engage in a critical analysis of the 2003 Decision on 
Implementation. Section V focuses on pharmaceutical abuses in the United States and the 
current efforts by the FTC and the private sector to fight these abuses. In Section VI, I 
examine current efforts to establish a multilateral framework on competition law and 
policy and the obstacles to these efforts. Paradoxically, although many developing 
countries do not have any competition law and are likely to benefit from such a 
framework, developing countries have strongly opposed the idea of a multilateral rule on 
competition policy. I conclude in Section VII by noting that although welcomed, despite 
the flexibilities afforded by the Doha Declaration and the Decision, few compulsory 
licenses will be issued. 
I advance seven reasons for my position. First, very few countries have the 
capacity to effectively exploit a compulsory license should one be issued; also very few 
countries have internal procedures for granting compulsory licenses.29 Second, 
29 MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114.
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developing countries that are starved of foreign exchange and desiring to attract foreign 
direct investment would most likely refrain from liberally utilizing the flexibilities.30
Third, developing countries that desire to encourage inventive activity locally may also 
not want to liberally use compulsory licenses as this “could work against the interests of 
new domestic actors and have adverse demonstration effect on other potential 
investors.”31  Fifth, in situations where the cooperation of the right holder is needed to 
acquire the technology needed to work with the protected invention, such cooperation 
may not be forthcoming.32
The intersection of patent rights, global trade, public health and ethics unearthed 
many thorny issues. For example, is a balance between intellectual property rights, state 
sovereignty and ethics possible? Should ethical concerns and human rights norms trump 
over property (patent) rights?  Do the sovereign rights of states allow them the option of 
“opting out” of onerous and “mischievous” international obligations?  Does the TRIPS 
Agreement prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health?      
II. THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW: BACKGROUND TO THE TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY (“TRIPS”) AGREEMENT 
AND THE COMPULSORY LICENSING DEBATE
The last three hundred years has witnessed tremendous evolution in our notion of 
property. From its once humble beginnings focused on tangibles, the notion of property 
has broadened to include intangible products of the human mind such as patents, 
30
 In effect, the granting of compulsory license has its drawbacks and should not be seen as  the preferred 
option for countries. See MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114 (noting that “foreign companies may be 
reluctant to invest in developing countries with a propensity to grant compulsory licenses.”).
31
 WATAL, supra note 15, at 382.
32 Id.
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trademarks and copyrights. For the most part, this development in the notion of property 
occurred primarily in Europe and North America.33 As long as information could be 
contained within national borders, domestic law was considered sufficient in regulating 
dealings in intellectual property. Intangible property are however much more fluid than 
tangible property and transverse national boundaries much more readily. By the end of 
the 19th century, counterfeiting and piracy in the global marketplace had become a strong 
concern of many countries; in the industrialized world, there was a growing realization 
that multilateral efforts were needed to address these concerns. This triggered a century-
long effort directed at expanding and universalizing intellectual property laws (what I 
refer to as “the globalization project”) culminating in the adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement in 1994.34
A. The TRIPS Agreement
 Initial efforts to globalize and harmonize intellectual property law produced two 
significant international treaties: the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”)35 and the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”).36 However, January 1, 1995, marked a major 
turning point in the globalization project with the entry into force of the TRIPS 
33
 For literature on the history and development of intellectual property in the West, see BRUCE BUGBEE, 
GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166 (1948); Giulio Mandich, Venetial Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARKE OFF. SOC’Y 166 (1948); F.D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787, 
26 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944).
34
 For an interesting history of the globalization of intellectual property rights and the role of international 
institutions and global corporate actors in this effort, see generally, MATTHEWS, supra note 22.
35 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, available at  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html [hereinafter Berne Convention].
36 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/index.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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Agreement.37 Negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations,38 the TRIPS Agreement comes as a package-deal meaning that all WTO 
Members are automatically bound by the agreement.39
In terms of coverage, the TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive 
multilateral instrument on intellectual property rights.40 The TRIPS Agreement is 
innovative in at least five ways. First, the TRIPS Agreement represents the first time in 
the history of multilateral trade negotiations that intellectual property has been integrated 
into an international trade agreement. Second, compared to preexisting instruments, the 
TRIPS Agreement contains a detailed provision on enforcement and imposes detailed 
obligations on States.41 Third, the TRIPS agreement establishes a strong monitoring and 
supervisory scheme through the machinery of the TRIPS Council, a marked departure 
from the norm in previous conventions.42 Fourth, the TRIPS Agreement addresses 
37
 For literature on the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement, see generally, Frank Emmert, 
Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized 
Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1317 (1990);  G.E. Evana, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The 
Making of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 WORLD 
COMPETITION 2, 137-180 (1994); D. Gervais, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
(1998).
38
 The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
The agreement is annexed to the final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Punta del Este, Uruguay (September 20, 1986), reprinted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round].
39
 With the exception of four “plurilateral” agreements, all the WTO agreements apply to all WTO 
members. With one signature, WTO members each accepted all the Uruguay Round agreements as one 
single package. See World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Introduction (“The WTO framework ensures a 
‘single undertaking approach’ to the results of the Uruguay Round –  thus, membership in the WTO entails 
accepting all the results of the Round without exception.”).
40
  The TRIPS Agreement deals with all types of intellectual property rights. The agreement covers: 
Copyright and Related Rights (Section 1); Trademarks (Section 2); Geographical Indications (Section 3); 
Industrial Designs (Section 4); Patents (Section 5); Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits 
(Section 6); Protection of Undisclosed Information (Section 7); and Control of Anti-Competitive Practices 
in Contractual Licences (Section 8).
41 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Articles 41 – 49.
42 Id. at Article 68 (“The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of this Agreement and, in 
particular, Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the 
opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.”). 
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compliance and enforcement questions through its automatic linkage with the WTO 
dispute settlement system; this ensures a permanent quasi-judicial, dispute resolution 
mechanism to address intellectual property controversies.43 Finally, WTO Members 
cannot enter a reservation in respect of any of the provisions of the Agreement without 
the consent of the other Members.44 Overall, the TRIPS Agreement offers an 
institutionalized, multilateral, and comprehensive mechanism for addressing intellectual 
property-related issues and disputes.45
           The success of the globalization project is reflected in the minimum substantive 
and procedural standards of protection for intellectual property protection that the TRIPS 
Agreement establishes. With respect to patents, the agreement lays down standards 
relating to patentablility, scope of patent protection, limitations on patent rights, and 
enforcement. Article 27 stipulates that patents shall be available “for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”46 and that “patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.”47
43
 The dispute settlement mechanism was established pursuant to a separate agreement. See The  Uruguay 
Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm.
44
 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 71.
45
 Debroy, supra note 6 (noting that WTO is “a better forum for establishing global norms in IP, not only 
because more countries are members of the WTO, but also because the WTO system ensures enforcement 
and compliance through the dispute resolution and retaliation provisions.”).
46
 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 27 (emphasis added).
47 Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Globalization Amidst Growing Discontent
The TRIPS Agreement exposes the North-South asymmetries in global trading 
arrangements.48 To developed-country governments, the TRIPS Agreement was 
conceived primarily as an instrument to combat global counterfeiting and piracy, 
eliminate distortions in and barriers to global trade, allow the industry to recoup research 
and development (“R&D”) costs, and guarantee a fair return on investment in innovative 
research.49 These goals, they argued, must be met within the context of limited monopoly 
granted by patents.  During the negotiation for the TRIPS Agreement, multinational 
corporations and developed-country governments also argued that an enhanced global IP 
regime would facilitate long-term economic development in developing countries by 
fostering technology and investment flow to the later.50
To some non-governmental organizations and some developing-country 
governments, however, the TRIPS Agreement is but one component of a broader policy 
of technological protectionism “aimed at consolidating an international division of labour 
whereunder Northern countries generate innovations and Southern countries constitute 
the market for the resulting products and services.”51 The real motivation for TRIPS, 
some have argued, was to “freeze the comparative advantages” that had ensured Northern 
48
 Numerous articles have been written on the subject of North-South asymmetries in international trade. 
Several articles have also explored the implications of the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries. See 
generally, CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000); Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of 
TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245 (1994); 
E. Durán and Constantine Michalopoulos, Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries in the 
WTO Millenium Round, 2 (6) J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 853 (1999). 
49
 CORREA, supra note 48, at 4.
50 MATTHEWS, supra note 22.
51
 CORREA, supra note 48, at 5 (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement aims at stifling imitative paths to 
industrialization).
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technological supremacy and counter Northern countries’ declining competitive position 
in the global market.52
Viewed also from the perspective of developing countries, critics also argue that 
the trend is not really towards a globalization of intellectual property rights or IPR’s 
(suggesting a convergence of norms and harmonization of standards), but really a 
universalization of standards of protection that is Northern-grown53 and suitable for 
industrialized countries.54 In other words, given developing countries’ dependence upon 
innovations made in the North55 and their negligible share of the world market in 
medium- and high-tech goods,56 it is believed that industrialized countries have the most 
to benefit from the TRIPS Agreement. 
 Finally, there is also the perception in the developing world that the TRIPS 
Agreement could be used to prevent poor countries from achieving important social and 
developmental goals.  The fear is that by ignoring the profound differences in economic 
52 Id. (noting the TRIPS Agreement was “an expression of an aggressive action by the United States to 
establish international rules that counter their declining competition in world markets.”).
53
 Id. (noting that in negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, industrialized countries had the objective of 
universalizing the standards of intellectual property protection that they had incorporated into their 
legislation.  He notes further that the emerging framework of intellectual property protection in the TRIPS 
Agreement “basically universalizes standards of protection that are suitable for industrialized countries.”).
See also, UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (“[T]he protection 
contained in the TRIPS Agreement focuses on forms of protection that have developed in industrialized 
countries.  For example, in the case of patents, the protection in the Agreement is most relevant to the 
protection of modern forms of technology, such as biotechnology, and most relevant to innovators situated 
in a selected number of industrialized countries.”).  
54
 Some scholars question whether developing countries are really ready to have strong intellectual property 
rights. They point to the fact that industrialized countries were also able to establish higher standards for 
intellectual property protection after they had attained a certain level of technological and industrial 
capacity.  CORREA, supra note 48, at 5.
55 Id. (citing studies by Nagesh that estimate that of the patents granted in the United States between 1977 
and 1996, developing countries accounted for less than 2%, while 95% of 1,650,800 patents granted were 
conferred on applicants from 10 industrialized countries).  See KUMAR NAGESH, TECHNOLOGY 
GENERATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: RECENT TRENDS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5-9 (1997).
56 Id. (citing estimates by Alcorta and Peres to the effect that of the exports of the Group of 7 (G7) to 
OECD countries, 56.7% consist of medium- and high-tech goods).  See LUDOVICO ALCORTA AND WILSON 
PERES, INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
5-6 (1995).
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and technological capabilities between the North and the South and by offering a one-
size-fits-all approach to intellectual property protection, the TRIPS Agreement will be 
progressively used to curtail policy options in developing countries and hamper States in 
their efforts to address serious health emergencies.
C. The Pharmaceutical Industry, AIDS Epidemic and the Compulsory 
License Debate
The pharmaceutical industry is at the center of the debate about the relationship 
between patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement, and public health. Until recently, “the 
patent law of most poor countries exempted pharmaceutical products from patents.”57 As 
a result of the TRIPS Agreement, however, many countries amended or are in the process 
of amending their patent law to comply with TRIPS. In the wake of huge AIDS 
epidemics decimating millions of lives in the developing world, how to balance the patent 
right of pharmaceutical corporations against the sovereign rights of states to determine 
their internal health policies and ensure that essential drugs are available and accessible 
to their citizens surfaced. Also, the question how to balance the patent rights of 
pharmaceutical corporations against core internationally guaranteed rights such as the 
right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,”58 assumed a 
central place in this debate.59 Essentially, developing countries governments, civil society 
57
 Julian Morris, TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate, Introduction and Summary (July 2001), 
available at http://www.policynetwork.net/pring/morris.htm.  See also MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114 
(observing that for many developing countries “the underlying rationale for excluding pharmaceutical 
products from patent protection in the pre-TRIPS era was to enhance access to medicine and healthcare.”).
58 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N.GAOR Supp. 16) at 49, U.N. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force January 3, 1976. 
(Article 12 provides: “The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”).
59
 For a human rights analysis of the TRIPS Agreement, see United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights: 
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groups and AIDS sufferers feared that the TRIPS Agreement could be used to disrupt the 
availability of cheap generic pharmaceutical products and that developing countries 
would be forced to obtain brand-name pharmaceutical products from multinational 
companies at exorbitant prices.
i. The AIDS Epidemic: As of December 2001, the total number of people (adult 
and children) living with HIV/AIDS (“PLHA”) was estimated at 40 million60 and the 
total number of children orphaned by AIDS and living was estimated at 14 million.61 Of 
the total number of PLHA, 95% live in the developing world.62 Five million people 
became newly infected with HIV in 2001 and 3 million AIDS deaths were recorded in the 
same year.63
The discovery of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (“HAART”) as a 
treatment for AIDS led to a paradigm shift in most of the industrialized world because 
HARRT brought about significant reduction in the prevalence of AIDS-related morbidity 
and mortality in the West. In the West, it became possible to view AIDS not as a death 
sentence but as a manageable chronic disease.64 However, in most of the developing 
world the story was different.  As a result of the absence of HAART, instead of 
Report of the High Commissioner, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, June 27, 2001, at 3 (noting that the TRIPS 
Agreement could affect the enjoyment of several rights including the right to food, the right to 
development, and the human rights of indigenous peoples).
60 See JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC,
8 (2002) (hereinafter REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC). See also, JOHANNES VAN DAM AND 
SHERRY A. HUTCHINSON, ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS: REPORT OF A MEETING OF 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS, JUNE 12-13, 2001, 1 (2002), [hereinafter ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR 
HIV/AIDS].
61 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC, supra note 60, at 8.
62 ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS, supra note 60, at 1.
63REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC, supra note 60, at 8.
64 ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS, supra note 60, at 3 (“…in the United States, the number of 
PLHA increased from 174,244 in 1993 to 317,368 in 1999, while mortality associated with AIDS 
decreased from 45, 494 to 16, 767 in that same period.”).
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treatment, the focus of national programs and international support was on prevention, 
the treatment of opportunistic infections, care, and support.65 The principle barrier to 
treatment frequently cited by national governments and donor agencies was the cost of 
HAART (estimated at US$10-$15,000 per person per year in 2001).66 Thus, as of 2001, 
despite breakthroughs in medicine, only 230,000 of the 6 million people who were sick 
enough to require HAART were receiving it. Of these, half lived in Brazil.67 This meant 
that at least 96% of people in developing countries who needed treatment were not 
receiving it.
ii. Does TRIPS Provide an Answer? Against the backdrop of a massive 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and reported welfare effects of pharmaceutical product patents in 
developing countries,68 some governments in the developing world began to explore the 
possibility of using compulsory licenses to lower drug prices. These countries acted on 
65 Id.
66 Id. (other reasons cited included the capacity of health care delivery systems and the ability of patients to 
adhere to lifelong treatment regimens).
67
 In Brazil, the government instituted a universal access to AIDS treatment program. This led to a 54% 
reduction in AIDS-related mortality between 1995 and 1999. Treatment provision has resulted in overall 
cost-savings for the government, in terms of avoided hospitalization and reduction in the burden of 
opportunistic infections, totaling US$677 million between 1997 and 1999. Some observers attribute the 
success in Brazil to the government’s aggressive involvement in the manufacture of generic versions of 
several HIV drugs in its own government laboratories. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIDS SERVICE 
ORGANIZATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF NATIONAL RESPONSES IN IMPROVING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS TREATMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK  11 
(2002) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON AIDS & HUMAN RIGHTS].
68
 Poor developing nations appear to be the most affected by global patent protection laws. In many 
countries, welfare losses which economists attribute to heightened patent protection are beginning to 
appear.  Nogués, a World Bank economist, estimates that minimum welfare loss to developing countries of 
patent pharmaceutical products would amount to a minimum of US$3.5 billion and a maximum of US$10.8 
billion, while the income gains by foreign patent owners would be between US$2.1 billion and US$14.4 
billion. .  Julio Nogués, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on Developing 
Countries, 24 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 6 (1990) (cited in CORREA, supra note 48, at 35) Several studies in 
developing countries support Nogués conclusions. These studies point to the appearance of about a six-fold 
increase of drug prices with the introduction of product patents compared to non-patented products, a 
strong correlation between the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents and significant (as much as 
45%) reduction in the consumption of medicine, and wide disparities in prices of drugs between countries 
where patent protection exists and countries with no protection.  Id.
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the assumption that the TRIPS Agreement allowed governments to address critical 
shortages in essential drugs through compulsory license. However, countries that 
attempted to address domestic health crisis through compulsory licensing came under 
heavy attack from the pharmaceutical industry69 and from some governments in the 
developed world, particularly the U.S. government.70
The problem was that even though the TRIPS Agreement addresses conditions for 
the grant of compulsory licenses and does appear to allow governments some flexibility 
to enable them address domestic crisis, the entire agreement is riddled with ambiguities 
and permits multiple interpretations. What flexibilities does the TRIPS Agreement afford 
governments? First, governments can exclude certain inventions from patentability.71
Second, pursuant to Article 30, governments can place some exceptions on the rights of a 
patent holder provided such exceptions do not “unreasonably” conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent.72 Third, WTO Members are allowed to control anti-
69
 In 2001, a group of multinational drug companies took the South African government to court for 
attempting to import generic versions of AIDS drugs from India. The multinational companies were forced 
to withdraw their suit after adverse media attention.  See USA Today, Drug companies Drop Lawsuit 
Against South Africa, June 19, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001-04-19-
drugsuit.htm.
70
 Past attempts by South Africa, Thailand, and Brazil to compulsorily license the manufacture of critical 
drugs for treating HIV/AIDS resulted in threatened economic sanctions from the U.S. Government and 
invocation of the WTO dispute settlement procedure by the U.S. Government. See generally, OSTERGARD, 
JR., supra note 4 (in chapter six entitled “Life, Death and Intellectual Property: The South Africa-US 
Patent Dispute,” Ostergard Jr. discusses attempts by the United States to get the South African government 
to adjust its patent laws to enhance protection for pharmaceutical patents).
71 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 27 (2) (“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law.”).
See also, Article 27(3) of TRIPS under which WTO Members are permitted to exclude from 
patentability: “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals” and 
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.”  
72
 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 30 (“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
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competitive practices and prevent abuse of rights by patent holders.73 Fourth, parallel 
importing is very possible under the TRIPS Agreement.74 Most important, the 
preamble,75 Article 7 (“Objectives”)76 and Article 8 (“Principles”)77 of the TRIPS 
Agreement provide a broad framework for interpretation that, if followed, would have 
allowed for a balanced result in the debate.
Regarding compulsory licenses, although Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
appeared to accord WTO Members broad rights to grant compulsory licenses,78 a debate 
ensued regarding the precise scope of the flexibility permitted governments and the 
precise grounds for which compulsory license may be issued.79
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”).
73
 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 8(2) (“Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by 
right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.”).
74
 Parallel import permits countries to search for the lowest price for parented products worldwide and 
import from the lowest source. It is based on the principal that once a patent-holder sells goods, he has lost 
his right to control the resale of those goods; in other words, he is said to have “exhausted” his property 
rights in the product. The TRIPS Agreement is vague on the subject and arguably left the issue of parallel 
importing unaddressed.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 6 (Article 6 provides: “For the 
purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing 
in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).
75
 In the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, Members recognize "the underlying public policy objectives of 
national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives."  Members also recognize "the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect 
of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to 
create a sound and viable technological base,” and the fact that “patent rights cannot be paramount to 
overarching public policies, in particular health policies."
76
 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”).
77 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 8(1) (“Members may, in formulating or amending their laws 
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that 
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”).  
78
 Article 31 outlines the conditions a government must meet when issuing a compulsory license. What 
conditions? First, there must be a prior effort to negotiate a voluntary license with the patent holder on 
“reasonable commercial terms” and within a reasonable period. This requirement is waived in the case of a 
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.” 
See Article 31(b). Second, “the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it 
was authorized.”  See Article 31(c). Third, the patent owner is to be paid “adequate remuneration …taking 
into account the economic value of the authorization.” See Article 31(h).
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The pharmaceutical industry argued that the relationship between TRIPS, patents 
and access to medicine was tenuous at best.80 According to the industry, the causes of 
lack of access to essential drugs in developing countries were legion and generally 
included official corruption, misguided taxation, systemic poverty, exorbitant retail 
markups and the general lack of infrastructure.81 The argument, thus, was that patent 
protection is but “a very small part of a much bigger issue”82 and that compulsory license 
should be allowed only in very limited circumstances. Essentially, while welcoming the 
TRIPS Agreement, the industry called for a tightening of the provisions of the 
Agreement.83
Developing countries, on the other hand, view compulsory license as a critical 
pathway to ensuring low-cost drugs. By facilitating generic entry and generic 
competition, they argued, it would be possible to ensure that essential drugs are 
accessible, available and affordable. While avowing commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, developing countries were of the view that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement 
reduced the range of options available to governments to promote and protect public 
79
 In the light of efforts by countries such as United States to “punish” countries that attempted to exercise 
their rights under Article 31 and a lawsuit filed against the South African Government by a group of 
pharmaceutical companies, developing countries began to push for a clarification of Article 31. Developing 
countries wanted a common understanding that confirm the right of governments to make use of the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement whenever the exercise of intellectual property rights result in barriers 
to access to essential drugs. At a TRIPS Council meeting of 2-6 April 2001, the decision was made to hold 
a special session to initiate discussions on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of 
the TRIPS Agreement based on a proposal by the Africa Group.  See World Trade Organization, Council 
for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights, Submission by the African Group, Barbados, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, IP/C/W/296, June 29, 2001, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter Submission by the African Group].
80
 Debroy, supra note 6, at 3.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83
 The following websites have helpful information: www.ifpma.org (International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) and www.phrma.org (Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America).
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health84 nor placed a restriction on the purposes for which compulsory license could be 
issued.85 Developing countries also pointed to the fact that some developed countries 
were great users of compulsory licenses.86
Domestic and international Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGO’s”) and 
AIDS support groups also argued that TRIPS put profit over human lives in the 
developing world. By forbidding the easy and cheap copying of patented drugs, these 
groups argued, the TRIPS Agreement constrained the ability of developing-countries to 
address immediate loss to the welfare of domestic consumers.87 The solution, they 
argued, was compulsory licensing. 
III. THE DOHA DECLARATION AND 
THE 2003 DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION: 
A REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW?
The Doha Declaration88 and the 2003 Decision on Implementation89 now appear 
to lay to rest the different debates regarding compulsory licensing. The 2003 Decision on 
Implementation was adopted by the General Council in the light of a “Statement of 
Understanding” read out by the Chairperson of the General Council of the WTO.90 In this 
84 Submission by the African Group, supra note 79, at 5.
85
 Several scholars support the position that the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the grounds upon which 
compulsory license may be issued. See CORREA, supra note 48, at 89-90 (arguing that although the TRIPS 
Agreement refers to five specific grounds for the granting of  compulsory license, the Agreement did not 
limit the members rights to establish compulsory license on other grounds not mentioned).  See also 
WATAL, supra note 15, at 380 (observing that the final text of Article 31 places no restrictions on the 
purposes for which compulsory license could be authorized). 
86 Submission by the African Group, supra note 79, at 28.
87
 Debroy, supra note 6, at 3.
88 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra  note 15 and accompanying text.
90 See World Trade Organization, The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, August 30, 2003, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm [hereinafter 
Statement of Understanding].  The Chairperson of the General Council is Carlos Pérez del Castillo, 
Uruguay’s ambassador to the WTO.
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section, I shall briefly highlight the key provisions of the Doha Declaration, bring readers 
up to date on the Paragraph 6 question – the question that was left unaddressed in the 
Doha Declaration, and extensively examine the 2003 Decision on Implementation. In 
Part A, I examine the main provisions of the Doha Declaration. In Part B, I highlight the 
main issues that arise in the Paragraph 6 question. In Part C, I highlight and critically 
examine the main provisions of the 2003 Decision on Implementation. In Part D, I 
examine the main contours of the Statement of Understanding issued by the Chairperson 
of the General Council. A more detailed evaluation of the merits and demerits of the 2003 
Decision on Implementation will be undertaken in Section IV. 
A. The Doha Declaration
The Doha Declaration reiterates the importance of an effective intellectual 
property regime for the development of new medicines while recognizing the concerns 
about the effect of intellectual property on drug prices.91 The Doha Declaration also 
stresses the need for the TRIPS Agreement to be part of wider national and international 
action to address the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-
developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other epidemics.92 Paragraph four, one the most ambitious provisions in the declaration, 
provides:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health.  Accordingly, 
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that 
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
91 Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at  para. 3.
92 Id. at para. 1-2.
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manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.93
Regarding the flexibilities permitted members under the TRIPS Agreement to 
promote access to medicine, the Doha Declaration, reaffirms “the right of WTO Members 
to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for 
this purpose.”94 More specifically on compulsory licenses, the Doha Declaration states 
that, “[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted”95 and that in deciding to 
grant compulsory license “[e]ach Member has the right to determine what constitutes a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.”96
The Doha Declaration was undoubtedly a victory for developing countries. The 
declaration is most useful to countries with local technological, productive and regulatory 
capacity to support generic industries.97 Moreover, even if a country has sufficient 
capacity to support local production, it may be economically inefficient “to require 
domestic production for every medicine a country may need.”98 For countries with 
insufficient manufacturing capacity and countries whose generic industries may not 
operate on an economy of scale for every drug required domestically, the obvious 
93 Id. at para. 4.
94 Id.
95
 Id. at para. 5(b) (emphasis added).
96 Id. at para 5(c) (emphasis added).
97
 Sun, supra note 4, at 107.
98 Id. 
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solution is to import generic drugs manufactured under compulsory license from other 
countries. However, the Doha Declaration did not decide the question whether such 
importation of generic drugs manufactured under compulsory licenses was permitted. 
Rather, Paragraph 6 reads: 
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.  We 
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this 
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.99
The Paragraph 6 issue triggered another year of debates, discussions and 
negotiations in the WTO. Although the TRIPS Council considered a draft decision at the 
end of December 2002, and despite approaching the year-end deadline stipulated in the 
Doha Declaration, the issue remained unresolved as a result of the inability of WTO 
Members to reach a consensus on the issue.
B. The Paragraph 6 Question
The Paragraph 6 question arises because of a restriction contained in Article 31(f) 
of the TRIPS Agreement. 100 Article 31(f) appears to prohibit the export of products 
manufactured under a compulsory license by specifying that a compulsory license shall 
be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market authorizing such use. 
99 Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at para. 6.
100
 Article 31(f) states, “Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent 
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by 
the government, the following provisions shall be respected:…. Any such use shall be authorized 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use” (emphasis 
added).
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The rationale behind Article 31(f) “lies in the territorial nature of patent law and in the 
need to avoid circumvention of patent rules.”101
As a result of Article 31(f), uses permitted by a compulsory license are limited to 
those aimed at predominantly supplying the domestic market of the WTO Member 
granting such a license. Although Article 31(f) does allow a non-predominant part of the 
pharmaceutical product manufactured under compulsory license to be exported, 
difficulties arise where a country lacking domestic manufacturing capability is seeking to 
import massive quantities of generic drugs from the manufacturing country. As stated by 
the United States in its communication to the WTO:
Difficulties could arise, therefore, when a country with insufficient 
domestic manufacturing capacity and experiencing grave health problems 
seeks to import a needed pharmaceutical from a manufacturer in a WTO 
Member where a patent exists on that pharmaceutical.  In this situation, it 
currently would be inconsistent with Article 31(f) for that WTO Member 
to grant a compulsory license to its manufacturer to produce the drug 
solely for export to the country that has insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.  It is this situation that the TRIPS 
Council must address.102
WTO Members disagreed on the procedural mechanism needed to address the 
problem as well as the substantive solution that was needed to address the problem. At a 
March 2002 TRIPS Council meeting, four different solutions were proposed: (i) an 
authoritative interpretation of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement;103 (ii) an amendment 
101 See European Communities, Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States 
to the TRIPS Council Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (Brussels, June 18. 2002), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/intell/ 
intel3.htm [hereinafter EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6].
102 World Trade Organization, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health: 
Second Communication from the United States, IP/C/W/358, July 9, 2002 [hereinafter Second 
Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6].
103 Article 30 provides that “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by 
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.” An authoritative interpretation of Article 30 would have recognized the 
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to Article 31 in order to overcome the Article 31(f) restriction;104 (iii) a moratorium on 
dispute settlement with regard to the non-respect of the restriction under Article 31(f);105
and (iv) a temporary waiver with regard to Article 31(f).106
C. The 2003 Decision on Implementation
The 2003 Decision on Implementation takes the form of a provisional waiver to 
Article 31(f) and allows countries to export generic drugs to third countries with no 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.107 The Decision pertains only to 
pharmaceutical products.108 It lays out the obligation of exporting members, eligible 
importing members, other members of the WTO, and the TRIPS Council. The Decision 
includes safeguards against abuse and trade diversion and lays down rules to ensure 
transparency. The Decision also contains provisions on transfer of technology and 
regional cooperation. In the following section I shall outline the main provisions of the 
Decision.
right of a WTO member to manufacture a patented drug for export to another country facing a public health 
crisis without having to resort to compulsory licensing. Numerous NGO’s supported this solution. Article 
XX:2 of the WTO Agreement stipulates the procedure for adopting official interpretation.
104
 An Amendment to Article 31 would have been in the form of a new paragraph which would carve out 
exceptions to the restrictions imposed by Article 31(f). The European Communities (“EC”) supported this 
solution arguing that “[t]he insertion of a textual provision into the TRIPS Agreement itself has the 
advantage of providing for a straightforward, clear, legally secure, effective and permanent solution within 
an existing legal framework, i.e. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.”  EC, Communications Relating to 
Paragraph 6, supra note 101. See also, EC Communication to the TRIPS Council of  March 4, 2002 
(IP/C/W/339).
105 A moratorium on dispute settlement would have operated as a pledge by WTO Members not to 
challenge any member that fails to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 31(f). The United States 
initially proposed and strongly supported this solution.
106 See EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 5.
107
 Paragraph 1 provides that “[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory license to the extent necessary 
for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing 
Member(s).”
108 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 1, at para. 1.
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1. Qualifying Countries: Which countries will benefit from the system? Which 
countries are excluded?
Only “eligible importing Members” can utilize the 2003 Decision on Implementation. 
Eligible importing members means “any least-developed country Member, and any other 
Member that has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the 
system as an importer.”109 The category of importing members is potentially broad. The 
only requirement is that a country wishing to use the system files a notification of intent 
with the TRIPS Council.  Some countries, mostly industrialized, have voluntarily decided 
not to use the system as importing Members.110
An “exporting Member” simply means “a Member using the system set out in this 
Decision to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an eligible 
importing Member.”111 It appears to mean that any country with manufacturing 
capacities, including industrialized countries, can export under this system.
2. Qualifying Products: Which products are covered by this system? What about 
vaccines?
The Decision is strictly limited to pharmaceutical products which are defined in 
paragraph 1 to mean “any patented product, or product manufactured through a 
109 Id. (emphasis added).
110
 Paragraph 1 notes that “some Members will not use the system set out in this Decision as importing 
Members and that some other Members have stated that, if they use the system, it would be in no more than 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id. See also footnote 3 to 
paragraph 1(b) (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America.). See also, Statement of Understanding, supra
note 90  (“Until their accession to the European Union, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia agree that they would only use the system as 
importers in situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. These countries 
further agree that upon their accession to the European Union, they will opt out of using the system as 
importers . . . some other Members have agreed that they would only use the system as importers in 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency: Hong Kong China, Israel, 
Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, United Arab Emirates.”).
111 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 1
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patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health 
problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration.”112 Active ingredients 
necessary for the manufacture of the pharmaceutical products and diagnostic kits 
needed for its use are also included in this definition. The definition of patented 
products appears to be broad enough to allow countries to address legitimate public 
health needs and would extend to vaccines.
3. Qualifying Diseases: What is the Disease Scope of the Decision?
       The Decision does not contain a list of qualifying diseases for which the waiver may 
be used – a major victory for developing countries. An effort by the U.S. to limit the 
disease coverage led to a major deadlock in negotiations and made it impossible for WTO 
Members to meet the 2002 year-end deadline stipulated in the Doha Declaration. In a 
January 7, 2003 letter to Ministers of the WTO, the European Union (“EU”) 
Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, suggested a compromise deal.113 The EU 
proposed that the mechanism apply to an initial list of infectious epidemics “which are 
generally recognised by health experts as those which have the most damaging impact on 
developing countries,” with an added suggestion that Members wishing to import 
medicines to meet a public health concern not explicitly covered in an initial list be 
encouraged to seek the advice of the World Health Organization (“WHO”).114  The 
proposal by the European Communities (“EC”) was subsequently rejected.
112
 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 1.
113 Pascal Lamy, Letter of the Commissioner to Ministers of the WTO (January 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/medecine/docs/plletter.pdf.
114 Id.  See also, EU seeks to break the current deadlock on WTO access to medicines: a multilateral 
solution is needed Brussels (January 9, 2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/ 
pr090103_en.htm. The proposal submitted by the EU outlined 23 infectious diseases that the EC believed 
had the most damaging impact on developing countries.  In addition to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis, the following additional diseases were suggested:  Yellow fever, plague, cholera, 
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4. Condition Precedent to Using the System: Will Beneficiary Countries Need Prior 
Authorization From the WTO to Use the System?
Generally, prior authorization of the TRIPS Council is not required before a 
member can utilize the mechanisms established by the Decision.115 However, the 
Decision does require that both importing and exporting countries file some 
notification with the Council for TRIPS. Countries, other than least-developed 
countries (“LDC’s”), intending to use the system as importers must establish that they 
have no manufacturing capacity and notify the WTO Accordingly. 
The Decision also lays down specific requirements that both importing and 
exporting countries utilizing the system must satisfy. Essentially, all countries have 
an obligation to ensure that medicines produced under the system are used for their 
intended purpose and are not diverted to other countries where they could compete 
with brand-name drugs manufactured by the original patent owner.
a) Obligation of Importing Countries: An eligible importing Member must 
make a prior notification to the Council for TRIPS specifying the names and expected 
quantities of the product(s) needed,116 confirming that the eligible importing Member in 
question “has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question,”117 and confirming that, “where a 
meningococcal disease, African trypanosomiasis, dengue, influenza, leishmaniasis, hepatitis, leptospirosis, 
pertussis, poliomyelitis, schistosomiasis, typhoid fever, typhus, measles, shigellosis, haemorrhagic fevers, 
and arboviruses.  
115 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, foot note 2 (“It is understood that this notification 
does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system set out in this Decision.”).
116Id. at para. 2(a).
117 Id. This requirement is waived for least-developed countries (“LDC’s”). The Annex to the Decision sets 
out two ways that a country can establish that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector. For the purposes of the Decision on Implementation, LDC Members are deemed to 
have insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. For other eligible importing 
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pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory, it has granted or intends to grant a 
compulsory licence in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
provisions of this Decision.”118
Importing Members have an obligation to prevent re-exportation of the products 
that have being imported into their territory under the system. To ensure that the products 
imported under the system are used for the public health purposes underlying their 
importation, eligible importing Members are required to “take reasonable measures 
within their means, proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade 
diversion to prevent re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into 
their territories under the system.”119
b) Obligation of Exporting Countries: Several obligations are imposed on 
exporting countries utilizing the system. First, such an exporting country must first issue 
a compulsory license in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Second, the 
compulsory license issued by the exporting Member must contain certain conditions. It 
must stipulate that “only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing 
Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this production 
shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs to the Council for 
TRIPS.”120 It must also stipulate that “products produced under the licence shall be 
Members, insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in question can be established in 
either of two ways. One way is for the  Member in question to establish that it has no manufacturing 
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. Where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector, it has to examine this capacity and determine that, “excluding any capacity owned or 
controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the purposes of meeting its needs.” In the later 
case, the system ceases to apply when it is established that such capacity has become sufficient to meet the 
Member's needs.
118 Id.
119 Id. at para. 4. 
120 Id. at para. 2(b)(i).
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clearly identified as being produced under the system set out in [the Decision on 
Implementation] through specific labelling or marking.”121 The exporting country must 
also require that “[s]uppliers …distinguish such products through special packaging 
and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that such 
distinction is feasible and does not have a significant impact on price.”122 Finally, an 
exporting country must require that before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a 
website “the quantities being supplied to each destination”123 and “the distinguishing 
features of the product(s).”124
A third requirement placed on an exporting member pertains to notification. An 
exporting Member is required to notify the Council for TRIPS of the grant of the license 
and the conditions attached to it.125 Finally, an exporting member who has granted a
compulsory license under this system has an obligation to pay “adequate remuneration” 
to the patent holder pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement.126
c. Obligations Imposed on Other WTO Members: All WTO Members are 
required to take necessary measures to prevent diversion. Members also agree not 
challenge actions taken by countries under this Decision. Paragraph 10 stipulates that 
“Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of 
the waivers contained in this Decision under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article 
XXIII of GATT 1994.”
121 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para, 2(b)(ii).
122 Id.
123 Id. at para. 2(b)(iii).
124 Id.
125 Id. at para. 2(c) (“The information provided shall include the name and address of the licensee, the 
product(s) for which the licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the 
country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of the licence.”).
126 Id. at para. 3.
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5. Safeguards against Diversion:
Measures against diversion are directed at preventing goods from being diverted 
from their intended purpose. In the course of negotiations on the Paragraph 6 issue,  
pharmaceutical companies expressed fear that cheaper drugs produced under compulsory 
license may be diverted to rich country markets where a different pricing system exists. 
To address this, all WTO Members are obliged to “ensure the availability of effective 
legal means to prevent the importation into, and sale in, their territories of products 
produced under the system set out in this Decision and diverted to their markets 
inconsistently with its provisions, using the means already required to be available under 
the TRIPS Agreement.”127
6. Surveillance and Review Mechanism
The Council for TRIPS assumes a new monitoring role under the Decision. 
Paragraph 8 stipulates that the Council for TRIPS “shall review annually the functioning 
of the system set out in this Decision with a view to ensuring its effective operation and 
shall annually report on its operation to the General Council.”128  The notifications 
required of exporting and importing countries also go to the Council for TRIPS.
7. Technology Transfers 
The Decision recognizes the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology 
and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem 
identified in paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. Consequently, the Decision calls on 
eligible importing Members and exporting Members to use the system in a manner that 
would promote the objective of technology transfer. Paragraph 7 contains a vague 
127 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 5.
128 Id. at para. 8.
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undertaking by Members “to cooperate in paying special attention to the transfer of 
technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector.”129
D. The Statement of Understanding
The original draft of the Decision was unacceptable to the U.S. and to the 
pharmaceutical industry. 130  To achieve a much needed consensus on the paragraph 6 
question, it became necessary for the Chairperson of the General Council to adopt a 
statement to accompany the Decision. The Statement of Understanding was issued 
essentially to placate the United States and the pharmaceutical industry and to ensure that 
WTO Members arrived at a consensus before the biennial meeting of the WTO 
Ministerial Conference. The Statement of Understanding has four important clauses: a 
good faith clause, an anti-diversion clause, a transparency clause, and a peaceful and 
expeditious settlement of dispute clause. 
According to the Statement, WTO Members “recognize that the system that will 
be established by the Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health” and 
129 Id. at para 7.
130
 When a draft of the Decision (known as the “Motta text”) was circulated in December 2002, the United 
States was the only country that refused to endorse the text.  On top of the Motta text, the U.S. government 
demanded: that any solution be restricted to "humanitarian use" (a vague clause that many feared could 
disqualify normal generic production); an “opt-out” clause that will hinder the economic viability of the 
solution; heavier burdens on suppliers to change the packaging of products made under this system; and a 
“review mechanism” to monitor the diversion of generics back into wealthy markets.  See Oxfam, US seeks 
further restrictions on generic medicines for developing countries (August 25, 2003), US seeks further 
restrictions on generic medicines for developing countries, available at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/ 
pr030825_TRIPS_health.htm (discussing how several NGO’s involved in the Paragraph 6 question –
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam, Health Action International (HAI), Third World Network (TWN) 
and the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) – have found additional demands by the U.S. to be a 
threat to the access of poor countries to needed medicines because they are, in effect, a “redundant layer of 
bureaucracy that can easily be manipulated to pressure countries out of the system.”).
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“not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives.”131 The 
Statement also contains an understanding among Members that the purpose of the 
Decision would be defeated if products supplied under the Decision are diverted from 
their intended market. Consequently, Members agree that “all reasonable measures 
should be taken to prevent … diversion in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the 
Decision.”132 The Statement, however, specifically states that “[i]t is the understanding of 
Members that in general special packaging and/or special colouring or shaping should not 
have a significant impact on the price of pharmaceuticals.”133
              The Statement also calls on Members to “seek to resolve any issues arising from 
the use and implementation of the Decision expeditiously and amicably.”134 To ensure 
transparency, the Statement of Understanding requires that notifications made under 
paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the Decision pertaining to eligibility of importing country include 
information on how the Member in question established that it has insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. 
The Statement of Understanding also confirms the new monitoring role of the 
TRIPS Council. Essentially, “[a]ny Member may bring any matter related to the 
interpretation or implementation of the Decision, including issues related to diversion, to 
the TRIPS Council for expeditious review, with a view to taking appropriate action.”135
Any WTO Member who has concerns that the terms of the Decision have not been fully 
131 Statement of Understanding, supra note 90.
132
 Id. The Statement notes that the provisions of paragraph 2(b)(ii) pertaining to the obligations of 
exporting countries with respect to labeling “apply not only to formulated pharmaceuticals produced and 
supplied under the system but also to active ingredients produced and supplied under the system and to 
finished products produced using such active ingredients.”
133
 Id.  Regarding special packaging and labeling, the Statement notes the fact that in the past and for 
different reasons, companies have developed procedures to prevent diversion of products.  Attached to the 
Statement, is a “Best practices” guideline that draws upon the experiences of companies.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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complied with, “may also utilise the good offices of the Director General or Chair of the 
TRIPS Council, with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution.”136
E. Conclusion
After all the battles over access to medicine and the relationship between 
patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement and public health, what exactly has been achieved? 
What can countries that are members of the WTO legitimately do to ensure that essential 
medicines are available and affordable? 
WTO Members have at least five options. First, where patent exists on a desired 
medicine, developing countries can still attempt to meet their needs by dealing directly 
with the patent holder through normal commercial arrangements and through aid 
programs such as donations and discounts.137 Second, also where patents exist on a 
desired medicine, a WTO Member with manufacturing capacity has the flexibility under 
the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration to grant compulsory license to permit 
the manufacture of generic versions of the same product.138  Third, where a WTO 
Member has insufficient or no manufacturing capability, such a Member can, without 
compulsory license, import generic pharmaceutical products manufactured in another 
country provided there are no patents on the pharmaceutical in question in the importing 
136 Id.
137 Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, at para. 7 (“First, difficulty 
would be expected to arise only in situations where the supply of the pharmaceutical in question has not 
been provided by the patent holder through normal commercial arrangements or through discount, 
donation, or other aid programs.  A TRIPS-based solution can also only be expected to be effective where 
Members have, or are provided, the resources necessary to procure pharmaceuticals under the terms of a 
TRIPS-consistent compulsory licence, which includes the provision of adequate remuneration to the patent 
holder.”).
138 Id. at para. 8.
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country and in the prospective exporting country.139  Fourth, where there are patents in 
both the importing and exporting country, compulsory license would need to be issued in 
both countries before medicines could be exported.  
Although the 2003 Decision on Implementation appears to be a victory for 
developing countries, its usefulness is yet to be tested. During negotiations the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”) and civil society groups had recommended a much
simpler, workable, and economically viable solution: allowing generic production for 
export as a limited exception to a patent right. There are fears that the Decision creates a 
costly and cumbersome process that could ultimately discourage generic production.
IV. ACCESSING GAINS; MAPPING PROGRESS: THE MERITS AND 
DEMERITS OF THE 2003 DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION
The objective of both the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on 
Implementation was to ensure speedy and low priced supplies of essential medicines to 
those in countries in need of them, while maintaining a legal environment that rewards 
inventors for their investment and encourages research and development into new 
products. Several questions inevitably arise. Will the adoption of the Decision enable 
countries in need of affordable medicines to import them quickly and easily from generic 
manufactures in other countries? Is the solution transparent and economically feasible? 
Will the Doha Declaration and the Decision ensure that needed drugs are available on a 
139
 In general, developing countries are not required to establish a patent protection regime under the TRIPS 
Agreement until January 1, 2005.  Thus, a developing country with manufacturing capacity and no patent 
laws can manufacture and export patented drugs without a compulsory license.
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sustained basis? Altogether, is the solution crafted in the Decision expeditious, workable, 
transparent, sustainable and legally certain?140
The questions are pertinent because although the 2003 Decision of 
Implementation is seen in some quarters as a balanced solution to the Paragraph 6 
question,141 many NGO’s are critical of the Decision.142 Critics argue that the Decision is 
140 Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 29  (arguing that “[w]hile 
each option suggested by Members has some merit, at this stage we believe an expeditious, workable, 
transparent, sustainable and legally certain solution may more likely be achieved through either a 
moratorium for dispute settlement or a waiver of the obligation in TRIPS Article 31(f).”). 
141
 On August 30, 2003, Shannon Herzfeld, Senior Vice President, International Affairs of the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (“PhRMA”), issued a statement that read in part: 
With the unanimous adoption of the Menon Statement and the Motta text, we are pleased 
that these negotiations have come to a conclusion….  The two decisions that the General 
Council reached today – the Motta text and the Chairperson’s statement –  will ensure 
that the system will not be abused.  The additional clarifications contained in the 
Chairperson’s statement add strong provisions to prevent diversion, and increase the 
likelihood that the solution will benefit patients in the world’s poorest countries as 
envisioned in the Doha Declaration.  Taken as a whole, this solution reaffirms the critical 
role of patents in the development of new medicines.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, Statement from Shannon Herzfeld, PhRMA’s 
Senior Vice President, International Affairs in reaction to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on 
TRIPS and Public Health, http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/30.08.2003.841.cfm
142
 In a Joint NGO Statement issued on September 10, 2003, twenty-one NGOs criticized several aspects of 
the 2003 Decision on Implementation.  According to the Joint NGO statement:
These are the main problems with the rules: 
1. The WTO is requiring the issuance of two compulsory licenses when the new mechanism is used. 
2. The WTO has added many constraints on the business practices of the generic companies. 
3. The WTO deal introduced an extra layer of uncertainty by stating that the system should not be an 
instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives, creating uncertainty over the role 
that will be played by the businesses that manufacture and sell generic drugs. 
4. The decision leaves unclear whether or not economic efficiency is a grounds for determining a 
lack of manufacturing capacity in the importing country. The lack of clarity on this issue has been 
defended as a matter of "creative ambiguity", but already the US is telling the Philippines and 
other countries that they will oppose "economic efficiency" as grounds for allowing a country to 
import generics. 
5. The deal gives the WTO itself new authority to second guess and interfere in the granting of 
individual compulsory licenses to generic companies. 
6. The United States and other Developed Economies now have greater opportunities to pressure and 
stop developing countries from issuing compulsory licenses.
Joint NGO Statement on TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deals on Medicine: A “Gift” Bound in Red Tape
(September 10, 2003), available at  http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos09102003.html [hereinafter Joint 
NGO Statement]. The statement was signed by the following organizations: ACT Up Paris; Consumer 
Project on Technology; Consumers International; Essential Action; European AIDS Treatment Group; 
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intended to “[l]imit the importance of the Doha Declaration,” “[p]rejudice more 
fundamental and sustainable fixes to the 31.f problems,” “[c]reate more and not less 
uncertainly regarding what can and cannot be done,”  and “[g]ive the US and the EU a 
big public relations bonanza which will be cruelly use [sic] as the basis for more bilateral 
pressure against the use of compulsory licenses and against better export strategies, as 
well as a basis to leverage additional concessions from developing countries in other 
WTO negotiations.”143 Overall, the belief is that "[t]he new agreement has very modest 
benefits,” and that “it has very substantial costs, risks and uncertainties.”144
In this Section, I focus specifically on the 2003 Decision on Implementation in 
part because The Doha Declaration has been the subject of a good many law review 
articles. I shall review the Decision in the light of some of the perceived concerns of
some of the NGO’s. Three main issues will be taken up. First, I shall examine the 
viability and sustainability of the waiver mechanism as a solution to the paragraph 6 
question.  Second, I shall examine the nature of obligations imposed on prospective 
importing and exporting countries to see if they are unnecessarily burdensome, onerous 
and an imposition on sovereignty. Third, I shall examine the gaps in the Decision – areas 
where the Decision is vague and could potentially create problems in the future for 
countries desiring to utilize the system. 
Health Action International; Health GAP; International People's Health Council; Médecins Sans Frontières; 
OXFAM International; People's Health Movement; SEATINI; Third World Network; Women in 
Development; CPTech; HAI; HealthGAP; MSF; Oxfam; and Third World Network.
143
 James Love, CPTech Memo, New Chairman's December 16, 2002 Text for para 6 negotiations
(December 16, 2002), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech12162002.html [hereinafter 
CPTech Memo].
144
 James Love, CPTech Statement, Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medicines (August 30, 2003), 
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech08302003.html [hereinafter CPTech Statement]. 
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A. The Waiver Solution
 Was the waiver solution the best possible solution to the Paragraph 6 question? 
The 2003 Decision on Implementation, which operates as a temporary waiver, offers a 
quick solution to a thorny problem but carries with it a lot of legal uncertainty. 145
Compared to a more formal amendment, a temporary waiver carried the advantage of 
speed146 and simplicity.147
Although the waiver solution had its advantages, an amendment would have 
offered the advantage of permanence, sustainability and legal certainty,148 although 
undeniably more time consuming to achieve than a waiver.149 The United States had 
opposed an amendment to Article 31(f) on the grounds that actions of countries acting 
under an amendment would have been susceptible to legal challenges which would have 
marred the legal certainty of the solution.150
145 EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para 6 (The EC observed that, “A 
waiver or a dispute settlement moratorium could be appropriate and effective mechanisms for a solution, 
but they may fall short of providing the type of sustainable and legally secure solution that the EC are 
aiming for.”).  See also Attaran, supra note 4, at 767 (noting that a waiver is only a temporary solution).
146 In the TRIPS Council, the United States has argued that “agreement can be reached on a … waiver 
much more easily and quickly than on an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement and further delay would be 
required for Members' formal acceptance.  Crafting an amendment on which all Members can agree would 
delay implementation of the ‘expeditious solution’ beyond the agreed deadline.”   See Second 
Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 29.
147
 Id. (“Should an amendment be adopted, it could prove to be either ineffective or seriously harmful in 
practice.  A further amendment of the Agreement would be required to correct this situation.”). 
148 EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 5 (arguing that an amendment 
“offer[ed] the best guarantees for a sustainable, balanced and workable solution.”).  See also EC 
Communication to the TRIPS Council of 4 March 2002 (IP/C/W/339).
149 EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 7.  An amendment to Article 31 
would fall under the procedural rules set out by Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement and is time-
consuming.  Id.  The EC noted that an amendment of paragraph 31(f) of TRIPS, as for all amendments of 
international agreements, is a procedure that takes time.  Id. 
150 Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 29 (arguing that “if a 
country begins production for export relying on either an authoritative interpretation or an amendment, its 
actions could be challenged as being inconsistent with the interpretation or amendment,” and such a 
country would only have full legal certainty after the conclusion of a dispute process.).
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Some NGO’s had suggested an authoritative interpretation of Article 30 as a 
solution.  Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO Members to provide limited 
exceptions to patent rights “provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.”151 Article 30 is seen to be politically more workable.152 Article 30 does not 
require a government decision each time a pharmaceutical product is needed and contains 
no stringent requirements such as the requirement to notify a patent owner of use or to 
pay reasonable remuneration to the patent holder.  
The Article 30 solution was not favored by the United States or the EC.153
Rejecting this solution, the U.S. argued that Article 30 is “intended to apply to statutory 
exceptions already provided for in many countries’ laws at the time the TRIPS 
Agreement was negotiated,”154 and that “[i]nterpreting Article 30 to allow Members to 
amend their patent laws to permit compulsory licences to be granted to authorize their 
manufacturers to produce and export patented pharmaceutical products to other countries 
would both unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent and 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.”155
The waiver solution is only temporary. Assessment of the wisdom of the solution 
will depend on how speedily WTO Members can adopt a more permanent amendment to 
151Id. at para. 31.
152
 Attaran, supra note 4, at 870.
153
 The EC rejected this idea arguing that “an authoritative interpretation on Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement may fail to offer the same level of legal security for all parties involved as a textual addition to 
Article 31(f) would do.” EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 6.  The EC 
questioned the legal merit of the Article 30 solution and thought it was doubtful whether the criteria of 
Article 30 offered sufficient scope for such an exception.  Id.
154 Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 31.
155 Id.
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Article 31(f). Although the Decision set a deadline for WTO Members to negotiate and 
adopt such an amendment,156 judging by past negotiating practices at the WTO157 and 
serious debates that preceded the adoption of the Decision, it could predictably take much 
more time for Members to negotiate and adopt the necessary amendments. Global 
corporate actors will predictably attempt to influence the negotiating position of 
developed countries governments, thus prolonging the time amendment process.158
B. The Conditions Attached
Does the Decision provide incentive for manufactures to participate and produce 
for export or does it de-incentivize generic production? Does the Decision contain 
onerous conditions that might discourage countries from utilizing the system? Asia 
Russell of Health GAP (an AIDS Activist Organization) has argued that the solution 
crafted by the Decision “is a failure for people with AIDS, and people everywhere dying 
of treatable diseases”159 because “[i]n the time it would take a generic company to 
156
 The Decision, including the waivers granted in it, “shall terminate for each Member on the date on 
which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that Member.”  2003 
Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 11.  The Decision authorizes The TRIPS Council to 
“initiate by the end of 2003 work on the preparation of such an amendment with a view to its adoption 
within six months, on the understanding that the amendment will be based, where appropriate, on this 
Decision and on the further understanding that it will not be part of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 
45 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.”  Id.
157
 Attaran, supra note 4, at 708 (predicting that negotiations could drag on for years and that during 
negotiations, developed countries and pharmaceutical companies will attempt to resuscitate proposals that 
were rejected).
158 MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 6 (suggesting that global corporate actors will continue to play a pivotal 
role in any future renegotiation of the TRIPS Agreements and that “[t]heir interests are likely to be at the 
for front of developed country perspectives on future requirements of intellectual property protection.”).
159
 Health GAP Global Access Project, Bush Administration, Big Pharma about to secure disastrous 
"solution" on access to medicines at the WTO in effort to boost failing pre-Cancun talks, countries are 
poised for sell-out on public health, Press Release ( August 28, 2003) , available at 
http://www.healthgap.org/press_releases/03/082803_HGAP_PS_WTO_para6_aug30text.html
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comply with all the conditions set out by the U.S., a patent would likely expire 
anyway.”160
Under the Decision, there are at least six steps to acquiring needed medicine 
through compulsory license:161
• Step 1: A prospective importing country must first seek a voluntary license from 
the patent owner; such a license is supposed to be on commercially reasonable 
terms and for a commercially reasonable period of time.
• Step 2: If attempt to secure a voluntary license fails, an entity must apply for a 
compulsory license to manufacture the medicine locally.
• Step 3: Where the compulsory license is by a country that has no capacity to 
manufacture the medicine locally and the country is not a least-developing 
country, such a country must assess its industry’s capacity to produce the 
medicine locally, notify the TRIPS Council of its determination that it has no or 
insufficient capacity, and explain and justify its decision regarding capacity.
• Step 4: An importing country must identify and notify a willing exporter in a 
country that has sufficient capacity to manufacture the needed medicine.
• Step 5: The prospective exporter must seek a compulsory license from its own 
government.162 In granting the license, the prospective exporting country must 
ensure that the conditions stipulated in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement are 
met. One important condition is that the exporting country must pay “adequate 
compensation” to the patent holder.
160 Id. 
161 See 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14.
162
 It is possible that the exporter may be required first to seek a voluntary license from the patent holder.
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• Step 6: If and when a license is granted, the exporter must take adequate 
measures as stipulated in the Decision to prevent diversion. In particular, the 
exporter must: (a) produce only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the 
eligible importing Member; (b) export the entirety of the production to the 
Member(s) which notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS; (c) clearly identify 
the products produced under the system through specific labeling or marking, 
special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves; 
(d) before shipment begins,  post on a website, the quantities being supplied to 
each destination and the distinguishing features of the product(s).
i. Notification Requirements: The Decision creates a somewhat cumbersome 
procedure for countries with no or insufficient capacity which does not exist for countries 
with manufacturing capacity.163 Although the system is supposed to be automatic, the 
TRIPS Council can second-guess a country’s decision to utilize the system and has 
enough mandate to interfere and scrutinize the granting of compulsory license.164 Some 
NGO’s have expressed concern that the notification requirements would be used to 
increase bilateral pressure on weak countries, both exporting and importing.165
    Additionally, some organizations have argued that the Decision authorizes 
unnecessary intrusion into sovereignty because it authorizes the WTO Secretariat, the 
163
 CPTech Statement, supra note 144 (“The WTO secretariat, the TRIPS Council and the Chair of the 
TRIPS council will now begin to routinely review the issuance of individual licenses, and the WTO will 
now as a matter of expected practice, oversee the use of compulsory licensing in the most intimate terms, 
looking at the terms of individual licenses, evaluating the basis for deciding manufacturing capacity is 
insufficient, or reviewing or second guessing any of the new terms and obligations that the new 
implementation language introduces into the regulation of compulsory licensing of patents on medicines.”).
164 Joint NGO Statement, supra note 142 (observing that Decision gives the WTO itself new authority “to 
second guess and interfere in the granting of individual compulsory licenses to generic companies.”). 
165
 CPTech Memo, supra, note 143.
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TRIPS Council and the Chair of the TRIPS Council to review the use of compulsory 
licensing in the most intimate terms . Currently, scrutiny is required on two levels: to 
evaluate the basis for a country’s decision that it lacks manufacturing capacity and to 
evaluate whether the obligations imposed on both the importing and exporting countries 
have been met. Some loss of sovereignty will be inevitable. The Decision was negotiated 
on the good faith understanding that it was aimed at addressing the problem of countries 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. It therefore stands to reason that some 
kind of review mechanism must be in place to ensure that countries utilizing the system 
are those for whom it was crafted. 
A more troubling concern is the emergence of three classes of states subject to 
three different rules in multilateral system made up of sovereign states and guided by the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination. First are states that choose to issue 
compulsory license under Article 31 of the traditional TRIPS Agreements; these will be 
subject to very minimal scrutiny but are not immune from legal action via the WTO 
dispute settlement process. Second are states that issue compulsory license under the 
Doha Declaration; these will be subject to some measure of scrutiny and are also 
vulnerable to the possibilities of legal action. Third are states with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity and utilizing the system established under the 2003 Decision on 
Implementation; these will be subject to more intense scrutiny because the grant of 
compulsory license under the Decision is far more complicated than is the case under the 
TRIPS Agreement. In return, however, countries utilizing to system receive some 
measure of immunity from potential lawsuits. 
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ii. Other Conditions: One problem that arises under the 2003 Decision on 
Implementation is the need for two separate compulsory licenses to effectuate one import 
request. Where a pharmaceutical product is patented in both the importing and exporting 
country, a compulsory license will have to be issued in each country. In other words, 
compulsory licenses to both exporters and importers would have to be negotiated and 
issued on a country-by- country and drug-by- drug basis. A manufacture desiring to 
produce for export must therefore first obtain compulsory license from its home country 
and ensure that compulsory license is also issued in the importing country. The granting 
of two compulsory licenses could create delays due to bureaucratic red tape.
iii. Measures to Prevent Abuses and Trade Diversion
From the beginning, developed countries expressed concern about abuses and 
trade diversion166 and called for stringent preventive measures. The prevention of trade
diversion, the EC argued was “of major importance to guarantee the legal security of the 
right holders concerned and to preserve the basic principles of the TRIPS Agreement.”167
This explains the stringent conditions imposed on the exporting country and generic drug 
companies in these countries. Under the system, generic manufacturers must differentiate 
pill size, shape, and color from brand-name products.  
Are the safeguards on re-importation inappropriate? There is a legitimate fear that 
the safeguards may prove too costly for developing countries and generic manufacturers 
166 EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 13 (“It will be in the interest of 
all … that these products would not be diverted from their intended destination and that the system would 
not be [used] for purposes other than to provide pharmaceutical products … to those in need.”).  
167 Id.
48
alike and may altogether discourage the use of compulsory licensing.168 Some anti-
diversion measures are necessary however. Generic drug companies are not paragons of 
virtue.  To prevent unscrupulous generic producers from exploiting the system for their 
own personal gain, some safeguards are called for.
In conclusion, some of the conditions appear to be burdensome, may impose 
unnecessary costs on a country wishing to utilize the system, and may delay the delivery 
of affordable medicine to people who need it most – the sick and the dying. It becomes a
procedural nightmare when each condition has to be fulfilled over and over again for 
each and every drug and for each and every country to whom the drug will be exported.
The Decision appears to take this into account. For example, it provides that “[i]n the 
event that an eligible importing Member that is a developing country Member or a least-
developed country Member experiences difficulty in implementing this provision, 
developed country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions, technical and financial cooperation in order to facilitate its 
implementation.”169
C. Dangerous Vagueness
The fierce negotiation by countries such as the United States, Japan, EU and 
Switzerland at the TRIPS Council to introduce numerous limitations and conditions to an 
earlier draft of the Decision suggests that the battle over the precise scope of the Decision 
may be far from over. In the course of the negotiations, the U.S. government pushed for 
strong limitations, including a fixed list of diseases, restriction of the use of the system to 
168
 CPTech Memo, supra, note 143.
169 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 4.
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emergency situations and limits on eligible importing countries.170 A major concern now 
is that some countries may attempt to exploit the lacunas in the Doha Declaration and the 
Decision in furtherance of their narrow interest.171
1. The Scope of Diseases: The Decision is silent on disease scope. It is not 
clear whether the system can be used to address routine public health problems or 
whether it is limited to epidemics and other major health emergencies. 
The preamble to the Decision makes reference to the Doha Declaration.172  This 
could mean that the product scope will be defined by paragraph 1 of the Doha 
Declaration.173  The first paragraph of the Doha Declaration reads: “We recognize the 
gravity of the public health problems, afflicting many developing and least-developed 
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.”174
On the other hand, the Statement of Understanding is very telling. The Statement 
of Understanding explicitly notes that some countries will only use the system for 
emergencies. It can thus be deduced that the system will normally apply to non-
emergencies (including routine public health care). It would be most unwise to restrict the 
solution to medicines and medical technologies for the treatment of HIV/ADIS, 
170
 Médecins Sans Frontières, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, Doha Derailed: A Progress 
Report on TRIPS and Access to Medicines, Briefing for the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún
2003 (observing that the proposed list of diseases suggested by the U.S. had no public health rationale), 
available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/cancunbriefing.pdf [hereinafter Doha Derailed].
171
 CPTech Memo, supra note 143 (“Lack of clarity has not been useful for developing countries, and 
whatever is unclear will work against the developing countries.”).
172
 “Noting the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) (the 
“Declaration”) and, in particular, the instruction of the Ministerial Conference to the Council for TRIPS 
contained in paragraph 6 of the Declaration to find an expeditious solution to the problem of the difficulties 
that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could 
face in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement and to report to the 
General Council before the end of 2002.”  2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14.
173 EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 10 (suggesting that the product 
scope is already defined by the Doha Declaration).
174 Doha Declaration, supra note 9.
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tuberculosis and malaria because “[w]hile there is no doubt that these epidemics are 
ravaging developing countries, they cannot be considered the sole public health threats in 
poor regions – either now or in the future.” 175
2. Eligible Importing Members: It is evident that least developed countries or 
LDC’s qualify to use the system. The more difficult question arises with respect to other 
developing countries. Where a WTO Member is a large (disease-burdened), middle-
income country such as Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa, problems may arise 
because it may be difficult for such a country to prove to the satisfaction of the TRIPS 
Council that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. The Decision also “leaves 
unclear whether or not economic efficiency is a grounds for determining a lack of 
manufacturing capacity in the importing country.”176
3. Moratorium on Dispute Resolution? It is not clear whether members who 
utilize the system are completely immune from lawsuits under the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure. The Decision appears to create a non-binding moratorium by 
providing that “Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the 
provisions of the waivers contained in this Decision.”177  Much will depend on who has 
the final say on whether measures have been taken in conformity with the Decision and 
175
 See CPTech, US Government efforts to limit the scope of diseases in the implementation of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health have outraged the public health community, and have been 
presented in a highly dishonest way by the White House and USTR, damaging US reputation abroad
(March 5, 2003), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech03052003.html (quoting Allan 
Rosenfield, MD, Dean, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, Michael H. Merson, MD, 
Dean of Public Health, Yale University, Laurence G. Branch, Ph.D, Dean, College of Public Health, 
University of Southern Florida, Stephen M. Shortell, Ph.D, Dean, School of Public Health, University of 
California, Berkeley).
176 Joint NGO Statement, supra note 142.
177 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 10 (emphasis added).
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by what standard such determinations are made. Although the reviewing function rests 
with the Council for TRIPS,178 it bears to remember that membership in the Council is 
open to representatives of all WTO Members.179 The provision on moratorium falls short 
of an earlier suggestion that what was needed was a legally binding moratorium – a clear 
determination that actions taken under Article 31(f) would have been non-justiciable.180
Clearly, several provisions of the 2003 Decision could pose major problems for 
countries wishing to utilize the mechanism established under it because of their 
ambiguity. The situation is made worse by the fact that the legal status of the Statement 
of Understanding that accompanies the Decision is not entirely clear. According to the 
Chairperson of the General Council, the Statement of Understanding “represents several 
key shared understandings of Members regarding the Decision”181 and “the way in which 
it will be interpreted and implemented.”182
D. Conclusion
On the positive side, the very fact that 146 WTO Members were able to arrive at a 
measure of consensus in order to address the concerns of countries with no or insufficient 
178Id. at para. 8 (“The Council for TRIPS shall review annually the functioning of the system set out in this 
Decision with a view to ensuring its effective operation and shall annually report on its operation to the 
General Council.”). 
179
 WTO Agreement, supra note 5, at Article IV:5.
180
 Attaran, supra note 4, at 87 (proposing that the paragraph 6 mandate was better satisfied by a rule of 
non-justiciability, narrowly tailored to deal with the manufacture and export of generic drugs). The 
distinction between moratoriums and non-justiciability is clear. 
According to Attaran:
… whereas moratoriums are unilateral and not legally binding, non-justiciability would 
be multilateral and fully legally binding. This is because where the moratorium is only a 
promise not to bring a lawsuit ..., non-justiciability is a guarantee that those violations do 
not result in a lawsuit … before the WTO panels in the future. 
Id. at 70
181 Statement of Understanding, supra note 90.
182 Id.
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capacity is commendable. Also on the positive side is the fact that the scope of diseases 
for compulsory licensing does not appear to be limited as the U.S. initially suggested.  
Some of the conditions attached to the Decision are necessary to ensure that cheaper 
drugs do not flow back from developing countries to developed countries and to ensure 
that pharmaceutical companies recoup their returns on investment.
Some of the fears expressed by several NGO’s are unfounded and lack merit. For 
example, some organizations have argued that the Decision “introduced an extra layer of 
uncertainty by stating that the system should not be an instrument to pursue industrial or 
commercial policy objectives, creating uncertainty over the role that will be played by the 
businesses that manufacture and sell generic drugs.”183 Others have argued that the 2003 
Decision on Implementation “contradicts the basic principles of the WTO and fair 
trade”184 by prohibiting the export of drugs manufactured under the system to rich 
countries.185  The argument is that by reducing the size of countries that might import 
generic medicine to meet their public health needs it may not be cost-efficient for any 
generic manufacturer to participate in the system.186 These organizations would want 
generic producers to be allowed to export drugs produced under the new system to 
developed countries such as the U.S., Japan, or Australia, on the argument that if such 
large markets were excluded, drug production will not be economically efficient and 
183 Joint NGO Statement, supra note 142.
184 Id.
185 Id. at footnote 1 (arguing that the Decision “explicitly accepts a protectionist framework, where rich 
countries can export to poor countries, but 23 rich countries were allowed to bar imports from developing 
countries.”).
186
 Brook K. Baker, Health GAP, Vows of Poverty, Shrunken Markets, Burdensome Manufacturing and 
Other Nonsense at the WTO (September 27, 2003) (noting that 23 rich countries, representing 80% of 
global drug sales opted out of the export/import option and that ten countries seeking admission to the E.U. 
have also restricted their option to import”), available at http://www.healthgap.org/press_releases/03 
/092703_HGAP_BP_WTO_Cancun.html.
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attractive to generic firms.187 These lines of argument lack merit and ignore the good-
faith understanding on which the Decision was negotiated. Because the Decision was 
crafted to address the health problems of countries with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity, there is no reason for products manufactured under the system to be shipped to 
rich countries.
In the future, controversy may arise on the effect of the Statement of 
Understanding. It is currently not clear if and to what extent it eviscerates the Doha 
Declaration and if and to what extent it detracts from the terms and conditions of the 
Decision.188 Three clauses in the Statement of Understanding could pose a problem in the 
future: the good-faith clause,189 the anti-diversion clause, and the transparency clause.
V. ABUSES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A REVIEW OF 
EMERGING CASE LAW (THE U.S. EXAMPLE)
In the U.S., a troubling scenario is unfolding in the pharmaceutical 
sector – the increasing resort by pharmaceutical companies to a range of abusive and 
anticompetitive practices in an effort to preserve monopoly profits and maintain market 
187 Doha Derailed, supra note 170, at 3 (suggesting that it is essential to include large markets such as 
South Africa and Philippines in order to make drug production attractive to generic firms).  See also, 
CPTech Statement, supra note 144 (“The persons who have negotiated this agreement have given the world 
a new model for explicitly endorsing protectionism. The United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan 
and other developed economies will be allowed to bar imports from developing country generic suppliers –
under completely irrational protectionist measures that are defended by the WTO Secretariat and its most 
powerful members as a humanitarian gesture.”). 
188
 Baker, supra note 186 (arguing that the Statement of Understanding eviscerates the historic Doha 
Declaration).
189
 The good faith clause reads, “Members recognize that the system that will be established by the 
Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health and, without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the 
Decision, not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives.”  Id.  (noting that there 
is great confusion in the international press and NGO community about the text’s good faith requirement of 
the Statement of Understanding. There are speculations on whether it is designed to limit drug use in the 
importing country to public, non-commercial use and whether it applies to both locally produced generics 
and imported ones.).
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share. By exploiting loop-holes in a law originally passed to facilitate the speedy entry of 
generic drugs into the U.S. markets, some pharmaceutical companies have been able to 
either suppress or delay generic competition. 
The goal of this chapter is to highlight the different ways pharmaceutical 
companies (both brand name and generic) have attempted to “game” a system originally 
designed to increase generic competition and improve consumer welfare. By exploring 
loop-holes in a law passed to increase generic competition, drug manufacturers in the 
U.S. have secured greater profits for themselves without providing any corresponding 
benefit to consumers.190 The degree of abuse in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is 
reflected in the increasing number of private lawsuits against brand-name companies 
and/or generic companies for abuse of patent rights; it is also reflected in the growing 
number of antitrust enforcement actions affecting both brand-name and generic drug 
manufacturers that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is pursuing.191
Although the U.S. law in issue is very different from the international agreements 
under consideration in this article, nevertheless interesting parallels and useful lessons 
may be drawn. Many U.S. pharmaceutical companies operate as giant transnational 
corporations and are likely to be affected by the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision 
on Implementation. Given the tendency of these companies to game a domestic system 
designed to improve generic competition despite the strong regulatory oversight of the 
FTC and the rigorous anti-trust laws in the U.S., I argue that those pharmaceutical 
190
 Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Presented Before the 
Committee on Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. (June 17, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/030617pharmtestimony.htm [hereinafter Prepared Statement of the FTC 
2003].
191
 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforces federal consumer protection laws that prevent 
deception and unfair business practices and enforces federal antitrust laws that prohibit anticompetitive 
practices that restrict competition and harm consumers.  See FTC website at 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guideto ftc.htm.
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companies affected by the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation 
may also attempt to abuse the system established under these instruments absent strong 
oversight at the global level.
To appreciate the tactics used by pharmaceutical companies to either delay or 
suppress generic competition in the U.S., an understanding of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments” or “Hatch-Waxman”)192 is necessary.  Enacted in 1984, the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments changed substantially the law governing approval of generic drug 
products by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).193 One of the goals of Hatch-
Waxman was to increase opportunities for market entry by generic drug manufacturers.194
Although the goal of increasing generic drug entry was achieved,195 studies now show 
that two main provisions of Hatch-Waxman governing generic drug approval prior to 
patent expiration have potential for abuse and are susceptible to strategies that may 
actually prevent the availability of more generic drugs.196 In April 2002, the FTC began 
an industry-wide study that focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under 
Hatch-Waxman. The FTC issued its report - Generic Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: 
AN FTC Study – in July 2002.197
192
 Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) 
(codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994)) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Amendments].
193
 Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration, i (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.htm [hereinafter FTC, Generic Drug Entry].
194 Id.
195 Id. (“Generic drugs now comprise more than 47 percent of the prescriptions filled for pharmaceutical 
products – up from 19 percent in 1984, when Hatch-Waxman was enacted.”).  See also Families USA, The 
Drug Industry: Facts and Figures (noting that since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendment, 
consumer’s access to lower-priced generics has increased), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site
/DocServer/factsheet.pdf?docID=246 [hereinafter Families USA, The Drug Industry]. 
196 FTC, Generic Drug Entry, supra note 193, at i.
197 Id.
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One popular form of abuse is through anticompetitive agreements between brand-
name and generic drug companies.198 Another form of abuse is the improper listing of 
patents by brand-name companies coupled with frivolous lawsuits against generic 
companies that have the effect of delaying FTC approval of a generic drug.  Some 
companies also engage in false and deceptive advertising and marketing practices aimed 
solely at discouraging use of generic drugs once they are on the market. Part A provides 
an overview of Hatch-Waxman. Part B analyzes some of the abuses in the drug industry 
and the anti-trust action the FTC is taking against offending companies. In Part C, I 
highlight useful lessons that may be drawn from the United States.
A. The Hatch-Waxman Amendment: Statutory and Regulatory Background
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the “Act”) regulates the manufacture 
and distribution of pharmaceutical drugs in the U.S.199  Recognizing that the Act's 
“cumbersome drug approval process delayed entry of relatively inexpensive generic 
drugs into the marketplace,”200 Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the 
Act in 1984.201 One of the rationales behind the Hatch-Waxman Amendments was to 
make generic drugs more readily available.202 In fact, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
embody Congress’ attempt to “balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name-
brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop 
198
 The goal of the study was to determine whether some provisions of Hatch-Waxman are susceptible to 
strategies that delay and deter consumer access to low-cost generic drugs and whether alleged anti-
competitive agreements between brand-name and generic drug manufacturers that relied on certain Hatch-
Waxman provisions were isolated instances or more typical. Id. at 1.
199 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. [hereinafter “the Act”].
200 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F.Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D. D.C. 2000).
201 See Hatch-Waxman Amendments, supra note 192.
202 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 2647, 2647.
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new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic 
copies of those drugs to market.”203
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments established new guidelines that simplify the 
approval process for generic drugs. Previously, any company wanting to market a new 
drug had to secure approval from the FDA by filing a New Drug Application (“NDA”), a 
process that is often “time consuming and costly” because a NDA requires companies to 
submit specific data concerning the drug’s safety and effectiveness.204 Under the new 
guidelines, a generic drug manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(“ANDA”) that incorporates by reference the safety and efficacy data developed and 
previously submitted by the company that manufactured the original “pioneer” brand-
name drug. To obtain FDA approval, the ANDA filer must demonstrate that its product is 
“bioequivalent” to the pioneer drug.205  To protect the patent rights of the pioneer drug 
manufacturer, the ANDA filer must make one of four certifications in its ANDA 
concerning patents listed with the FDA for the pioneer drug,206 namely that (1) no patent 
for the pioneer drug is listed in the Orange Book (“Paragraph I Certification”); (2) the 
relevant patent listed in the Orange Book has expired (“Paragraph II Certification”); (3) 
the listed patent will expire on a particular date, and the ANDA filer does not seek FDA 
approval before that date (“Paragraph III Certification”); and (4) the listed patent “is 
203 Mylan, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (citations omitted).
204 Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.2001) (citations omitted), cert. 
denied 535 U.S. 931, 122 S.Ct. 1305, 152 L.Ed.2d 216 (2002).
205 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv)
206
 The Hatch-Waxman Amendments require a NDA to list any patents "which claim[ ] the drug ... or 
which claim[ ] a method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could 
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the 
drug." 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). The FDA maintains and publishes this information in the Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (commonly referred to as the "Orange Book"). See 
21U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A).
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invalid or ... will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic] drug” 
(“Paragraph IV Certification”).207
From a consumer interest standpoint and the standpoint of competition, an 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV Certification is dangerous in that it can and does frequently 
set in motion a process that could ultimately delay access to cheaper generics for three 
years or longer. The regulatory implication of a Paragraph IV Certification is significant; 
such an application has the potential to trigger the operation of two provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman – the “30-Month stay” and the “180-day period of exclusivity.”
1. The 30-Month Stay: An ANDA containing a Paragraph IV Certification (an 
“ANDA IV”) has “important legal ramification”208 because “it automatically creates a 
cause of action for patent infringement.”209 An ANDA applicant making such a 
certification must notify the owner of the listed patent upon the filing of such 
certification.210 Thereafter, the patent holder has 45 days to initiate a patent infringement 
suit against the ANDA applicant.211 If the patent holder does not commence an action 
within 45 days, the FDA may approve the ANDA at any time.212 If lawsuit is filed in a 
timely manner, the FDA cannot approve the ANDA for at least 30 months.213 Moreover, 
the court hearing the patent case may extend the 30-month stay if either party fails to 
“reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”214 However, if the court presiding over 
207 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(A)(4).
208 Mylan, 81 F.Supp.2d at 32.
209 Id.
210 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
211 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.  See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F.Supp.2d 740, 744 (E.D. 
N.Y.2001) (“Ciprofloxacin I “).This court noted that: 
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the infringement action determines before the 30-month period expires that the patent at 
issue is invalid or not infringed, approval is effective from the date the court decision is 
made.215
2. The 180- Day Exclusivity Period: Although potentially dangerous for a generic 
manufacturer because it places the manufacturer at risk for a patent infringement lawsuit, 
a Paragraph IV Certification carries some advantages. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
provide that the first company to submit an ANDA IV is awarded a 180-day period of 
exclusive rights to market the generic formula of the pioneer drug.216 Prior to the 
expiration of the exclusivity period, the FDA cannot approve any other ANDA for the 
same generic drug.217  The exclusivity period is triggered by either the commercial 
marketing of the generic drug by the first ANDA filer or the decision of a court finding 
the pioneer drug’s patent to be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, whichever is 
sooner.218
B. Anticompetitive Practices in the Drug Industry
Paragraph IV Certification has prompted some in the pharmaceutical industry to 
employ a number of anticompetitive practices that are currently the subject of private 
It seems relatively clear ... that if there is no resolution of the patent litigation and a stay 
is not granted, and the patent holder has not obtained preliminary injunctive relief, the 
ANDA filer may begin to market its product. In such an instance, the ANDA filer 
assumes the risk it might be found liable for infringing the pioneer manufacturer’s patent. 
215 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
216 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The 180 days of exclusivity means that “[n]o other generic can go to 
market until 180 days after the first generic goes to market or wins the patent lawsuit.” See also David A. 
Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 331 (2000) 
(“[T]he first generic firm to challenge a patent holder is the only generic firm that can enter; until it enters, 
no other generic firm can enter the market.”).
217 Balto, supra note 216, at 331.
218 Id.;  see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.107.
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litigation, FTC investigations and legislative proposals aimed at ensuring fair 
competition.  
One of these abusive practices is in the form of collusive agreements between 
brand-name manufacturers and generic manufacturers aimed at keeping the first generic 
off the market, which in turn blocks all subsequent generics from getting to the market. 
This arises because as discussed, the first ANDA filer with a Paragraph IV Certification 
receives 180 days of exclusivity and sometimes controls the timing of the drugs 
introduced into the market.219 Agreement between the first ANDA filer and a brand name 
drug manufacturer “can effectively prevent generic competition for the brand name drug 
for an indefinite period.”220  In exchange for agreeing not to enter the market, the first 
ANDA filer shares in the profits that flow from the brand name manufacturer’s continued 
monopoly.221 In one case, a brand-name drug company reportedly paid a generic 
manufacturer $4.5 million a month to not market its generic; 222  payments of up to $10 
million per quarter are not uncommon.223
Another form of abuse is the improper Orange Book listings that provide the 
opportunity for frivolous lawsuits by brand-name manufacturers who thereby trigger the 
30-months stay. Because the filing of a patent infringement lawsuit within 45 days of 
notice of a Paragraph IV Certification results in an automatic delay of the FDA approval 
219
 See 64 Fed. Reg. 42873, 42874 (“During litigation of many cases related to the 180-day exclusivity, the 
parties and courts have recognized the potential for the 180-day exclusivity to substantially delay the entry 
of competitive generic drug products into the market. This situation can occure when the marketing of any 
subsequent drug product is contingent upon the occurrence of an event that is within the first ANDA 
applicant’s control.”).
220
 Families USA, Collusion and Other Anticompetitive Practices: A Survey of Class Action Lawsuits 
Against Drug Manufacturers 5 (2002), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/classaction 
survey.pdf?docID=247 [hereinafter Families USA, Collusion].
221 Id. at 8
222
 Families USA, The Drug Industry, supra note 195.
223 Id.
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of the generic, brand name manufacturers have an incentive to claim, obtain, and list as 
many patents as possible in the Orange Book (a practice known as “warehousing” of 
patents). This puts brand name companies in a position to bring as many lawsuits as 
possible against a Paragraph IV filer. This is possible because “[e]ven a completely 
frivolous patent infringement action will preclude FDA approval for up to 30 months,”224
and invalid patents can form the basis for the 30-months stays.
Overall, by illegally manipulating the patent process and the FDA approval 
process to delay generic market, brand-name companies sometimes in collusion with 
generic companies, accumulate millions in additional sales.225 The ultimate victims in the 
patent game are the consumers who are denied access to cheaper drugs.226
  1. Collusive Agreements
Allegations that some brand-name companies have paid or attempted to pay 
generic companies not to enter and compete are rife. In reaching these agreements, the 
companies essentially use the generic company’s rights to the 180-day exclusivity to 
impede entry by other generic competitors.227 The FTC has found that frequently a brand-
name drug manufacturer and the first generic company to file an ANDA containing a 
Paragraph IV certification pertaining to a brand-name drug both have economic 
incentives to collude to delay generic entry.  “By blocking entry, the brand-name 
224 Families USA, Collusion, supra note 220, at 7. 
225 Id. (observing that for one drug alone, the brand name manufacturer accumulated at least $160 million 
in additional sales by delaying generic market entry from November 2000 to March 2001). 
226
 Id. (“Delaying the introduction of generic competition can protect drug company profits, but it costs 
consumers millions.”).  Studies show that consumers save considerably when they exercise their option by 
buying cheaper generics. Families USA rightly notes that “The first generic on the market is typically 
priced 20 to 30 percent below the comparable brand-name drug, but as more generics enter the market, 
consumers have more choices, and generic prices drop further.” Families USA, The Drug Industry, supra
note 195.
227 Prepared Statement of the FTC 2003, supra note 190, at 3.
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manufacturer may preserve monopoly profits. A portion of these profits, in turn, can be 
used to fund payments to the generic manufacturer to induce it to forgo the profits it 
could have realized by selling its product.”228 Also, “by delaying the first generic's entry -
and with it, the triggering of the 180 days of exclusivity - the brand-name and first-filing 
generic firms can sometimes forestall the entry of other generic products.”229
In this section, I take a look at on-going private litigation as well as FTC 
enforcement actions against some companies. One leading case230 settled by consent 
order involved an agreement between Abbott Laboratories (“Abbot”)231 and Geneva 
Pharmaceutical, Inc (“Geneva”)232 (collectively “Abbott/Geneva”).233 Since 2000, the 
FTC has settled at least three cases against brand-name companies and generic companies 
by consent orders.234
a) Private Litigation: In Re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation235 (Purchasers vs. Patentee)
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See FTC Complaint Against Abbott Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Docket No. C-3945, C-
3946 (May 22, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945complaint.htm [hereinafter Abbot/ 
Geneva Complaint].
231
 Abbott Laboratories was founded by Dr. Wallace C. Abbott over 100 years ago and is considered today 
one of the world’s top health care companies.  Abbott became a public company in 1929 and since then its 
financial performance has ranked among the best in the world.  Company headquarters are in Abbott Park, 
Illinois.  In 2003 the annual sales were $19.7 billion worldwide.  It has been named one of “America’s 
Most Admired Companies every year since 1984 by FORTUNE Magazine.  See http://www.abbott 
com/news/facts/corp.html.
232
 As of December 1, 2003 Geneva Pharmaceuticals changed its name to Sandoz.  See Media Release 
entitled “Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Renamed Sandoz, Inc (December 1, 2003), available at
http://www.us.sandoz.com/site/en/company/news/pool/sandoz_name_launch.pdf.  Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals, one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in the U.S., was a Novartis Company.  
Sandoz, a pharmaceutical company established in Switzerland in 1886, merged in 1996 with Ciba Geigy, 
forming Novartis Generics.  The name change took place “to unite its [Novartis’] generics operations.”  Id.
233 See infra notes 249-63 and accompanying text.
234
  The consent order in Abbott Laboratories is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/ 03/abbott.do.htm. 
The consent order in Geneva Pharmaceuticals is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os /2000/03/geneva 
d&o.htm.  See also FTC Complaint Against Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Docket No. 9293 (May 8, 
2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechst andrxcomplaint.htm [hereinafter Hoechst 
Complaint]. The consent order in Hoechst is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/hoechstdo.pdf.
235 261 F. Supp. 2d 188 [hereinafter Cipro Litigation].  
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In this case (“Cipro Litigation”), purchasers of antibiotic ciprofloxacin 
hydrochloride (“Cipro”), and advocacy groups, sued brand name manufacturer, and 
prospective manufacturers of cheaper generic version, claiming that agreement under 
which proposed manufacturers of cheaper generic version agreed to defer entry into 
market until expiration of patent held by brand name manufacturer, in return for 
payments to be received from brand name manufacturer, was illegal market allocation in 
violation of the Sherman Act § 1 prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade.236
Plaintiffs brought suit against Bayer AG, a German company, and its American 
subsidiary, Bayer Corporation (collectively, "Bayer") and Barr Laboratories, Inc. 
("Barr"); The Rugby Group, Inc. ("Rugby"); Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. ("HMR"); and 
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Watson") (collectively, "Generic Defendants"), alleging 
that Bayer and Generic Defendants (collectively, "defendants") entered into agreements 
that prevented competition in the market for Cipro in violation of federal and state 
antitrust laws.237
236 The court found that the injury requirement for a restraint of trade claim, under the Sherman Act (15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 26), was not satisfied by allegations that buyers of antibiotic ciprofloxacin hydrochloride 
(“Cipro”) were forced to pay inflated prices due to delay of market entry by manufacturers of generic 
version of drug, resulting from prospective generic version manufacturers’ settlement of brand name 
manufacturer’s patent infringement suit that would have otherwise resulted in judgment against brand name 
manufacturer, presenting opportunity to acquire generic version prior to expiration of patent; prospect of 
resolution of patent suit, by ruling of invalidity or noninfringement, coming before expiration of patent, 
was too speculative.  Id.
237 Plaintiffs’ moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for partial summary judgment finding 
that these agreements are per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and various 
state antitrust and consumer protection laws.  Id. at 230-32.  Defendants have filed a cross-motion seeking 
to dismiss plaintiffs’ respective complaints pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure 
to plead facts sufficient to sustain a Sherman Act violation.  Id. at 197-99.  These motions present difficult 
questions of antitrust law and its interaction with patent rights.  
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Bayer manufactures and distributes Cipro and holds the patent for the active 
ingredient in Cipro.238  In October 1987, Miles, Inc. (the predecessor to Bayer 
Corporation and the licensee of the 444 Patent) obtained FDA approval to market Cipro 
in the United States. In a letter dated October 22, 1991, Barr filed ANDA 74-124 for a 
generic, bioequivalent version of Cipro.  Barr’s ANDA included a Paragraph IV 
Certification seeking the FDA’s permission to market its generic drug before the 444 
Patent expired on the grounds that the patent was invalid and unenforceable.  As set forth 
in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, on December 6, 1991, Barr notified Bayer of its
ANDA IV filing and its assertions contained therein regarding Bayer’s 444 Patent. On 
January 16, 1992, Bayer commenced a timely patent infringement suit against Barr in the 
Southern District of New York, thereby triggering the 30-month statutory waiting period 
for FDA approval.  Subsequently, in November 1992, Bayer and Barr executed a 
stipulation whereby the parties agreed to extend the 30-month waiting period until final 
judgment was entered in the patent infringement action. This stipulation was “so ordered” 
by Judge Knapp on December 8, 1992. Absent this agreement, the stay would otherwise 
have expired on April 22, 1995. 
While the patent litigation was pending, in a letter dated January 4, 1995, the 
FDA granted tentative approval of Barr’s ANDA for generic Cipro.239 As the trial date 
238 In its patent application, Bayer AG claimed the active ingredient in Cipro – ciprofloxacin hydrochloride 
– in Patent No. 4,670,444 (the “444 Patent”), which was issued by the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) on June 2, 1987. Id. at 194.  The 444 Patent expires on December 9, 2003. Id. 
Cipro has been the best selling antibiotic in the United States for many consecutive years and is 
described as “the most prescribed antibiotic in the world.”  Id. Since 1987, Bayer has been the only 
producer of Cipro in the U.S., and, since 1997, Bayer has derived over $1 billion in U.S. net sales of all 
Cipro products.  Id.
239 Cipro Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 195.  Plaintiffs contend that this approval was tentative, rather than 
final, due to the parties’ stipulation to extend the 30-month stay.  In fact, in its letter to Barr, the FDA stated 
that “[i]n certain cases approval can be granted after the expiration of the 30-month period.... In this case, 
the 30-month option is not relevant.  The [FDA] was advised that on December 8, 1992, the court ordered 
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approached, Bayer and Barr reached a settlement that concluded the patent litigation in 
the Southern District. In connection with the settlement, on January 8, 1997, Bayer 
entered into three separate but interrelated settlement agreements with Barr, HMR and 
Rugby,240 and Bernard Sherman (“Sherman”) and Apotex, Inc. (“Apotex”) (collectively, 
the “Settlement Agreements”)241 and a supply agreement with Barr and HMR (the 
“Supply Agreement”).242 The terms of these agreements form the basis of plaintiffs’ 
allegations of a Sherman Act violation. 
Under the Settlement Agreements, Barr, HMR, Rugby, Sherman, and Apotex 
acknowledged the validity of the 444 Patent and additional U.S. Patents held by 
Bayer.243  In the Barr Settlement Agreement, Barr also agreed to amend its ANDA to 
change its Paragraph IV Certification to a Paragraph III Certification, thereby permitting 
Barr to obtain FDA approval to market generic Cipro only upon expiration of the 444 
Patent.244  The agreement also provided for an immediate $49.1 million payment from 
Bayer to the “Barr Escrow Account.” 245
that the 30-month period be extended[.]”  A year later, in January 1996, Bayer and Barr filed cross-motions 
for partial summary judgment.  Judge Knapp denied the parties’ respective motions in an order and opinion 
dated June 5, 1996. Upon a motion by Bayer to reconsider that ruling, the court re-affirmed its decision in a 
separate order and opinion dated September 5, 1996. After some postponements, trial of the patent 
litigation was finally scheduled to begin on January 27, 1997.  See id.
240 On March 29, 1996, Barr and Rugby entered into an agreement pursuant to which Barr agreed to share 
equally with Rugby (then a subsidiary of HMR) any rights and profits from the eventual marketing and/or 
distribution of Cipro, and, in return, Rugby agreed to finance a portion of the costs and expenses of the 
patent litigation (the “Litigation Funding Agreement”).  Id.
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 196.
243
 These patents claim, among other things, starting materials and intermediaries for use in preparing 
Cipro, some of the processes for preparing Cipro, and the specific tablet, oral suspension, and intravenous 
formulations that Bayer uses in its proprietary Cipro products.
244 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
245
 The “Barr Escrow Account” is a bank account established by Barr and HMR to receive payments made 
by Bayer. On January 9, 1997, Barr and HMR executed an escrow agreement that established this account 
and provided that Barr and HMR each would receive one-half of all funds paid by Bayer into the account.
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In the Supply Agreement, Barr and HMR agreed not to manufacture (or to have 
manufactured) Cipro in the United States.  In addition, the agreement provided that Bayer 
either will (1) supply Bayer-manufactured Cipro to Barr, HMR and Rugby for 
distribution in the United States, subject to certain price controls, or (2) make quarterly 
payments – varying from $15 million to approximately $17 million – to the Barr Escrow 
Account from January 1998 through December 2003 (when the 444 Patent expires). If 
Bayer does not license Cipro immediately, it has agreed to do so at a set price if another 
generic company successfully challenges the validity of the 444 Patent. In addition, 
defendants claim that Bayer agreed to supply Cipro to Barr for marketing under a generic 
label beginning six months prior to the expiration of the 444 Patent.  To date, Bayer has 
chosen to make payments to the Barr Escrow Account, which through December 2003 
will total approximately $398 million.246
246 On January 17, 1997, Bayer and Barr each issued a news release announcing the settlement and 
discussing the payment scheme set forth in the Supply Agreement.  In fact, the press releases note that the 
settlement is comprised of two components: (1) an initial cash payment and (2) a Supply Agreement, which 
sets forth Bayer’s option to make payments to the Barr Escrow Account or to provide Barr with Cipro that 
Barr would market pursuant to a license from Bayer. Also, on January 22, 1997, pursuant to the Barr 
Settlement Agreement, Barr filed an amendment to its ANDA 74-124, and in a letter to the FDA dated 
January 23, 1997, Barr amended its Paragraph IV Certification to a Paragraph III Certification. See id. 
196-97.
Pursuant to the terms of the Barr Settlement Agreement, Bayer and Barr submitted to Judge 
Knapp a two-page consent judgment (the “Consent Judgment”) that the parties had negotiated and that 
extinguished all claims raised in the patent litigation. On January 16, 1997, Judge Knapp signed the 
Consent Judgment in the form submitted by the parties.  The Consent Judgment entered judgment for 
Bayer, providing that the 444 Patent is valid and enforceable as to, and was infringed by Barr. There was 
no mention in the Consent Judgment of the payments Bayer agreed to make to the Barr Escrow Account or 
the agreement by Barr, HMR and Rugby not to manufacture and market a generic form of Cipro. The 
Settlement Agreements and the Supply Agreement were not filed with or otherwise provided to the patent 
court, but the court was appraised of the material terms of the settlement on January 30, 1997 when Bayer’s 
counsel forwarded Bayer’s news release to the court.  See id.
In July 1997, Bayer voluntarily submitted its 444 Patent to the PTO for reexamination, and, upon 
reexamination, the PTO reaffirmed the patent's validity.  Since the execution of the Settlement Agreements, 
four generic companies have filed ANDA IVs for Cipro and have mounted challenges to the 444 Patent 
similar to the challenge raised by Barr.  Id. at 197.  One challenge was dismissed, see Bayer AG v. 
Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., Docket No. 3:98 Civ. 4464 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 1999) (dismissing case per stipulation).  
Id. at 197.  Two other challenges were unsuccessful, see Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306 
(Fed. Cir. 2002),  and Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 867- B (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2001) 
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Regarding the antitrust issue, the court found no violation.  The court thought that 
the Settlement Agreements and Supply Agreement did not warrant per se condemnation 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and found that the case “should not be relegated to 
the per se category reserved for the most blatant antitrust violations.”247   The court 
thought that the plaintiffs failed to show that the Settlement Agreements and Supply 
Agreement imposed restraints with anticompetitive effects broader than the exclusionary 
effects of Bayer's patent. According to the court:
[w]hile an unfortunate aspect of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is that 
pioneer and generic drug manufacturers have often been entering into 
mutually beneficial agreements that result in delayed entry of generic 
drugs into the market place, the cases that have found such agreements per 
se illegal involve findings that the agreements at issue restrained 
noninfringing products, delayed generic entry and perpetuated litigation. 
Such is not the case here. 248
b) FTC Enforcement Action: Abbott/Geneva249
This case involved an agreement between Abbott and Geneva relating to Hytrin,  
Abbott's pioneer brand name drug.250 The FTC complaint alleged that Abbott paid 
Geneva approximately $4.5 million per month to delay the entry of its generic Hytrin 
product.251 According to the FTC complaint, Abbott's initial patent covering the chemical 
compound terazosin HCL expired in or around 1994. Between 1993 and 1995, Geneva 
(denying Carlsbad’s motion for summary judgment). Id. At present, Bayer sells the only ciprofloxacin 
hydrochloride drug available in the United States.  Id.
247 Cipro Litigation, 261 F.Supp.2d at 257.
248 Id. at 256.
249 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
250
 Hytrin contains Terazosin HCL a which is used principally to treat benign enlarged prostate and 
hypertension.  Abbott/ Geneva Complaint, supra note 230, at para. 10-11.  Total U.S. sales of terazosin 
HCL amount to approximately $540 million per year.  Id. at para. 11.
251 Id. at para. 27.
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filed ANDA’s covering a tablet form and a capsule form of generic terazosin HCL252 and 
was the first company to file an ANDA for each form.253 Surprisingly, in early 1996, 
Abbott notified the FDA of a new patent (‘207 patent) relating to its Hytrin product; 
according to FDA procedure, the patent was listed in the FDA Orange Book. In April 
1996, Geneva filed a Paragraph IV certification with the FDA and duly notified Abbott of 
the Paragraph IV certification.254 On June 4, 1996, Abbott promptly sued Geneva, 
claiming patent infringement by Geneva’s terazosin HCL tablet product.255  By filing the 
lawsuit within the requisite 45-day period, Abbott’s lawsuit triggered a 30-month stay of 
final FDA approval of Geneva’s terazosin HCL tablet ANDA, until December 1998. 
However, as the first generic company to submit a Paragraph IV Certification for generic 
terazosin HCL, Geneva was also entitled to the 180-day Exclusivity Period promised in 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The FTC complaint centered around an April 1, 1998, agreement between Abbott 
and Geneva. According to this agreement, Geneva agreed not to enter the market with 
any generic terazosin HCL capsule or tablet product until the earlier of: “(1) the final 
resolution of the patent infringement litigation involving Geneva's terazosin HCL tablets 
product, including review through the Supreme Court; or (2) entry of another generic 
terazosin HCL product.”256 At Abbott’s insistence, Geneva also agreed not to transfer, 
assign, or otherwise relinquish its right to a 180-day Exclusivity Period. In return, Abbott 
252
 Geneva submitted its tablet ANDA to the FDA in or around January 1993, and its capsule ANDA was 
submitted in or around December 1995.  Id. at para. 16.
253 Id.
254
 By filing a Paragraph IV certification, Geneva was essentially claiming that its generic terazosin HCL 
tablet and capsule products did not infringe any of Abbott’s patents covering terazosin HCL, including
Abbott’s newly listed ‘207 patent.  Id. at para. 17.
255
 It is significant that even though Geneva’s capsule and tablet involved the same potential infringement 
issues, Abbott made no infringement claim against Geneva’s capsule product. 
256
 Abbott/Geneva Complaint, supra note 230, at para. 26.
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agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month in non-refundable payments until a district 
court judgment in the parties' patent infringement dispute.257 Why did Geneva enter such 
an agreement? To Geneva, the agreement represented the "best of all worlds," because 
the company obtained a risk-free “monetary settlement on an ongoing basis until the 
litigation was resolved” and still could market its product exclusively for 180 days after 
the litigation was over.258
As a result of the agreement, Geneva began receiving monthly payments of $4.5 
million from Abbott and refrained from entering the market with its generic terazosin 
HCL capsules which was not under litigation. Geneva also refrained from entering the 
market with its generic terazosin HCL capsules even after September 1, 1998, when the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted its motion for 
summary judgment in its patent tablet litigation with Abbott and invalidating Abbott’s 
patent. Under the terms of its agreement with Abbott, Geneva still could not enter the 
generic terazosin HCL market until after the Supreme Court either denied Abbott’s 
petition for certiorari or disposed of the patent infringement litigation.259 In August 1999, 
Abbott and Geneva canceled their Agreement, perhaps as a result of the FTC 
investigation; on August 13, 1999, Geneva finally introduced its generic terazosin HCL 
capsule product to the marketplace.
257 Id. at para. 27 (Abbott and Geneva also agreed that if the district court declared that Geneva’s tablet 
product would not infringe any valid and enforceable claim of the ‘207 patent, Abbott would thereafter pay 
the $4.5 million monthly payments into an escrow fund until the final resolution of the litigation. The 
understanding was that the party prevailing in the litigation would receive the money in the escrow fund.).
258
 Id. at para. 29.
259
 On July 1, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, without dissent, 
the summary judgment in favor of Geneva. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 10, 2000.  Id. 
at para. 33.
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The FTC complaint alleged that the Abbot/Geneva agreement, “acted with the 
specific intent that Abbott monopolize the relevant market,”260 and “engaged in overt acts 
… in furtherance of a conspiracy to monopolize the relevant market, in violation of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended.”261 According to the FTC, 
the acts and practices of Abbott and Geneva “had the purpose or effect, or the tendency 
or capacity, to restrain competition unreasonably and to injure competition by preventing 
or discouraging the entry of competition in the form of generic versions of Hytrin into the 
relevant market.”262
The case was resolved by consent order.263 The order prohibited Abbott and 
Geneva from entering into settlement (brand/generic) agreements pursuant to which 
Geneva agrees not to: (1) enter the market with a non-infringing product, or (2) transfer 
its 180-day marketing exclusivity rights. The companies were also required to obtain 
court approval for any agreements made in the context of an interim settlement of a 
patent infringement action, that provided for payments to Geneva to stay off the market, 
with advance notice to the Commission to allow it time to present its views to the court. 
Finally, the companies were ordered to give advance notice to the Commission before 
reaching a similar agreement in non-litigation contexts. 
2. Improper Extension of Monopoly
Brand-name manufacturers in the U.S. also delay generic competition through the 
use of improper Orange Book listing which typically triggers the 30-month exclusivity 
260 Id. at para. 41.
261 Id.
262 Id. at para. 34.
263 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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period under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Improper extension of monopoly achieved through 
the improper Orange Book listing strategy typically “involves abuse of the Hatch-
Waxman process itself to restrain trade.”264 Indeed the FTC has found that sometimes, 
brand-name drug manufacturers “act strategically to obtain more than one 30-month stay 
of FDA approval of a particular generic drug.”265
Improper Orange Book listing could be characterized as a fraud on consumers and 
the FDA because oftentimes brand-name companies, motivated solely by the desire to 
delay generic entry, falsely and knowingly list invalid patents. The problem arises 
because of a loop-hole in the law. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act not all patents are 
eligible for listing in the Orange Book and entitled to the special statutory 30-month stay. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for listing only if two conditions are met.  First, listing 
is called for, if the patent “claims the drug . . . or a method of using such drug.”266
Second, listing is also called for if the patent is one “with respect to which a claim of 
patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner of 
the patent engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”267 The difference 
between listed patents and unlisted patents is that only the former triggers the automatic 
30-months stay.268
264 Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission: Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Presented Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, 
Washington, D.C. April 23, 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/02/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm 
[hereinafter Prepared Statement of the FTC 2002].
265 Prepared Statement of the FTC 2003, supra note 190, at 3.
266
 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1); 355(c)(2); 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (2003).
267
 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1); 355(c)(2); 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (2003).
268 See Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
File Nos. 001 0221, 011 0046, and 021 0181: Analysis to Aid Public Comment, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyersanalysis.htm [hereinafter In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company] (noting that in the case of patents not eligible for listing in the Orange Book, a branded firm still 
can sue a generic company for patent infringement, but under ordinary federal litigation procedures and 
without the benefit of an automatic 30-month stay).  In case of unlisted patents, to prevent sale of the 
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Brand-name companies are increasingly exploiting loop-holes in Hatch-Waxman 
and the FDA approval processes to the detriment of consumers. This arises because, 
despite the serious legal and competitive implications of Orange Book listings, “it is 
private parties, rather than the FDA, that in practice determine whether patents are 
listed.”269 Regarding the Orange Book listing, the role of the FDA is solely ministerial.270
Not only is the role of the FDA ministerial, generic applicants have no right to bring an 
action to challenge an NDA holder’s Orange Book listing as improper, the Federal 
Circuit has held.271 The overall result is that FDA’s listings do not create any 
presumption a patent is correct.272 Nevertheless, as long as a patent remains listed, a 
brand-name company “can continue to benefit from the availability of an automatic 30-
month stay of FDA approval of ANDAs, by initiating a patent suit against generic 
applicants.”273
Because the FDA accepts the Orange Book listing at face value, brand name 
companies can defraud the system through improper listing.274 The net result is that 
“brand-name companies are increasingly listing in the Orange Book, and suing on, 
multiple patents, and that these are frequently patents that have been listed after an 
generic product before conclusion of a law suit, “a branded firm must obtain a preliminary injunction, 
which requires that it demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, among other factors.” Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. (“The FDA has repeatedly stated that its role in patent listings is solely ministerial and that it lacks 
the resources and expertise to scrutinize patent information in the Orange Book.” Thus, “[e]ven when a 
generic applicant disputes a patent listing, the FDA merely asks the NDA holder to confirm that the listed 
patent information is correct. Unless the NDA holder itself withdraws or amends its listed patent 
information, the FDA will not remove the patent listings from the Orange Book.”). 
271
 Id. See also Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1329-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
272 Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that 
“the FDA’s listing should not create any presumption that [a] patent was correctly listed.”).
273 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
274 See, e.g., American Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (observing that 
the FDA “has refused to become involved in patent listing disputes, accepting at face value the accuracy of 
NDA holders' patent declarations and following their listing instructions.”).
73
ANDA has been filed.”275 In some cases (where the patent is obtained and listed after the 
generic applicant has filed its ANDA) multiple 30-month stays were possible; the FTC 
has found that additional delay of FDA approval (beyond the first 30 months) ranged 
from four to 40 months.276
a) Private Litigation: In Re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation277 (Generic 
Company vs. Patentee)
In this case, competitors filed antitrust claims against Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company (“BMS”)278 alleging that the company engaged in anti-competitive conduct by 
improperly extending its monopoly over buspirone hydrochloride (“buspirone”), an anti-
anxiety drug sold under the brand name BuSpar. On February 14, 2002, District Judge 
John G. Koeltl granted in part and denied in part Bristol-Myers motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' antitrust and related state law claims.279
The competitors allege that BMS attempted to extend and/or extended an 
unlawful monopoly over the market of buspirone tablets in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.280  The allegation is that through fraudulent patent filings with the FDA, 
BMS caused the agency to list the patent in question in the Orange Book and as a result 
blocked generic competition with its BuSpar product. Essentially, the FDA was 
precluded from approving the generic version of buspirone once BMS listed its ‘365 
275 Id.
276 Id.
277
 In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Buspirone 
Patent Litigation – Bristol-Myers].
278
 Bristol-Myers Squibb Company is a pharmaceutical company headquartered in New York City.  In 2002 
it reported $18.1 billion in global sales.  See www.bms.com/aboutbms/data/.
279
 Buspirone Patent Litigation – Bristol-Myers, supra note 277.
280 15 U.S.C. § 2
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Patent281 in the Orange Book.282  Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that BMS made a bad 
faith attempt to interfere with the generic competitors’ entry into the buspirone market.  
This is alleged to have been done by asserting to the FDA that the ‘365 patent covered 
the approved uses of buspirone when BMS knew that these assertions were false. They 
also claim that BMS pursued patent infringement suits – thereby obtaining an automatic 
stay of the FDA’s approval of the generic version of buspirone subsequent to 21 U.S>C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), with knowledge that the stay was obtained by making false statements 
to the FDA.283  Currently, this litigation is still in its initial phases and the court has not 
ruled on any substantive anti-trust or patent issues. While the private lawsuit is still 
pending, the FTC has commenced enforcement action against BMS and announced that a 
consent agreement had been reached.
b) FTC Enforcement Action: 
i. Biovail (Tiazac)284
The first FTC enforcement action to attempt to remedy the effects of an allegedly 
anticompetitive Orange Book listing was against Biovail Corporation (Biovail).285 In the 
complaint, the FTC charged that Biovail illegally acquired an exclusive patent license 
and wrongfully listed that patent in the Orange Book for the purpose of blocking generic 
competition to its branded drug Tiazac. As a result of the listing, Biovail was able to 
commence an infringement lawsuit against Andrx, thus triggering triggered a 30-month 
281
 This, of course, is the patent in controversy within the patent infringement portion of the case.  
282
 In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 208 F.R.D. 516, 518.
283 Id. at 520.
284 See FTC Complaint Against Biovail Corporation (April 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2002/04/biovailcomplaint.htm [hereinafter Biovail Complaint].
285
 Biovail Corporation describes itself as a “full-service pharmaceutical company, engaged in the 
formulation, clinical testing, registration, manufacturing, sale and promotion of pharmaceutical products.” 
See http://www.biovail.com.
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stay of FDA final approval of Andrx’s generic Tiazac product. According to the FTC 
complaint, Biovail knew that the new patent did not claim the form of Tiazac that it had 
been marketing, and Biovail did not need this new patent to continue marketing Tiazac 
without infringement risk. The FTC further alleged that Biovail misleadingly represented 
to the FDA that the new patent claimed existing-and-approved, rather than revised-and-
unapproved, Tiazac, to avoid de-listing from the Orange Book and termination of the stay 
against Andrx. According to the complaint, Biovail’s patent acquisition, wrongful Orange 
Book listing, and misleading conduct before the FDA were acts in unlawful maintenance 
of its Tiazac monopoly, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act286 and Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.287
On April 23, 2002, the FTC announced that it had accepted for public comment 
an agreement and proposed consent order with Biovail Corporation.288 The consent order 
required Biovail to divest the illegally acquired patent to its original owner, dismiss its 
infringement case against Andrx thus allowing entry of generic Tiazac, and to refrain 
from further action that may trigger another 30-month stay on generic Tiazac entry. The 
consent order also required Biovail to give the FTC prior notice of acquisitions of patents 
that it intended to list in the Orange Book for Biovail's FDA-approved products. 
ii. In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
In an April 14, 2003 complaint, the FTC charged that BMS engaged in a series of 
unlawful acts to delay competition from generic versions of three of its major drug 
286
 Biovail Complaint, supra note 284, at para. 54-57.  Section 5 of the FTC Act is found at 15 U.S.C.§ 45.
287
 Biovail Complaint, supra note 284, at para. 50-53.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §
18.
288
 The consent order in the Biovail matter is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/biovaldo.pdf 
[hereinafter Biovail Consent Order].
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products.289  The FTC subsequently announced that it has accepted for public comment 
an agreement and proposed consent order with BMS which is intended to settle the 
charges against the company.290 In its complaint, FTC alleged that BMS abused 
governmental processes in order to delay generic competition to the three prescription 
drugs, and, in particular, that it misused the regulatory scheme established by Congress to 
expedite the approval of generic drugs.291 In issue was BMS’s activities relating to three 
of its prescription drug products: BuSpar, an anti-anxiety agent; and two anti-cancer 
drugs, Taxol and Platinol. The complaint relating to BuSpar is discussed here.
BMS began selling BuSpar in 1986. By 2000, BuSpar sales in the United States 
were over $600 million. In anticipation of the expiration of its ‘763 patent pertaining to 
BuSpar in November 2000, the FTC complaint alleged that BMS filed a new patent 
application with the PTO in 1999, involving the use of buspirone to create the metabolite 
of buspirone.292 After repeated rejection of its patent application by the PTO, BMS 
succeed in obtaining a patent (patent ‘365) only hours before patent ‘763 was about to 
expire.293  BMS proceeded to submit the ‘365 patent details to the FDA for listing in the 
Orange Book. The complaint further alleged that BMS's ‘365 patent “did not meet either 
of the statutory requirements for listing a patent in the Orange Book, because it does not 
claim BuSpar or a method of using BuSpar, and it is not a patent with respect to which a 
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted against someone selling 
289 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292A metabolite is the new molecule created when a pharmaceutical agent breaks down in the body.
293
 BMS was repeatedly rejected because the company had been making and selling BuSpar to treat anxiety 
in the U.S. for nearly 14 years. Patent ‘365 was issued only after BMS  request a patent that claimed solely 
the use of the metabolite of buspirone - not the use of buspirone itself.
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BuSpar.”294 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that “[a]lthough BMS knew that it had 
only obtained a patent claiming a method of using a metabolite, it nonetheless submitted 
a declaration to the FDA affirming that the ‘365 patent claimed a method of using 
BuSpar, in order to list the patent in the Orange Book.”295 Worse, after ANDA filers on 
BuSpar asserted to the FDA that the ‘365 patent did not meet the criteria for listing in the 
Orange Book, BMS intentionally made an additional false and misleading statement.296
The FDA without making any independent determination regarding the scope and 
coverage of the ‘365 patent, accepted at face value BMS’s statements and, thus, deemed 
the ‘365 patent listed in the Orange Book as of November 21, 2000. The FTC complaint 
charged that BMS “knew that its representations to the FDA - to the effect that the '365 
patent claimed a method of using buspirone - were false and misleading,”297 but 
nevertheless “made these misrepresentations purposely and intentionally, to obtain an 
improper Orange Book listing of the ‘365 patent.”298 As a result of its wrongful listing in 
the Orange Book, BMS “illegitimately acquired the ability to trigger a 30-month stay, 
thereby delaying entry of generic buspirone and depriving consumers of lower prices and 
other benefits of competition.”299  It is pertinent to note that generic competition to 
BuSpar occurred only after the ‘365 patent was removed from the Orange Book in March 
2001, following a district court decision ordering BMS to seek de-listing.300
294 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
295 Id.
296 Id. (“The FDA asked BMS to provide a declaration that the ‘365 patent contains a claim for an 
approved use of buspirone. BMS responded with a declaration expressly affirming that the ‘365 patent does 
in fact claim the approved uses of buspirone, a statement that was false and directly contradicted 
representations BMS made to the PTO to obtain the ‘365 patent.”).
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300
 See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). The Federal Circuit later 
reversed this ruling on jurisdictional grounds. See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1329-
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The FTC also alleged that the patent infringement suits BMS brought against 
ANDA filers for infringement of the ‘365 patent “were objectively baseless and filed 
without regard to their merits”301 and that the intent and effect of BMS’s suits “was to 
wrongfully trigger the 30-month stay as a means of preventing generic buspirone 
manufacturers from marketing their products.”302 Entry of a lower-priced generic version 
of BuSpar would have resulted in a significant, immediate decrease in the sales of the 
BMS’s brand-name drug and would have led to a significant reduction in the average 
price for the products in the relevant market, hence the motivation to game the system. 
FTC thus charged BMS with engaging in acts that willfully maintained its monopolies in 
buspirone in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The proposed consent order,303 bars BMS from seeking to list the ‘365 patent in 
the Orange Book in relation to any NDA in which the active ingredient is buspirone. The 
proposed order also contains general prohibitions “designed to deter improper listings 
and to prevent BMS from triggering the Hatch-Waxman automatic 30-month stay in 
circumstances that could improperly block generic entry.”304 The consent order also 
contains a general prohibition on false statements to the FDA.305 Regarding the 
33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the court held that no private right of action existed under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act to seek de-listing).
301
 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
302 Id.
303 See Biovail Consent Order, supra note 288.
304 Id. (“Paragraph VI would bar BMS from Orange Book listings that are contrary to the statutes and 
regulations governing such listings. For example, this provision would prohibit listing patents in the Orange 
Book that do not actually claim the drug product at issue…. In addition, Paragraph VII bars BMS from 
acting to obtain or maintain a Hatch-Waxman 30-month stay on FDA approval in certain specified 
situations.”)
305
 The purpose was “[t]o ensure that BMS does not seek to obstruct generic competition through false 
statements to the FDA outside the Orange Book listing context, such as through the citizen petition 
process.” See In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268. (“Paragraph VIII bans false 
and misleading statements to the FDA that are material to the approvability or sale of a generic version of a 
BMS brand-name drug product, unless BMS had a reasonable belief that the statement was neither false nor 
misleading.”). Id.
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allegations that BMS engaged in sham litigation, the proposed consent order bars BMS 
from “asserting any patent infringement claim that is objectively baseless; or seeking to 
enforce a patent that BMS knows is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed..”306
The Orange Book listing scheme established by the Hatch-Waxman Act naively 
assumed that brand-name companies (as NDA holders) would act in good faith in listing 
patents.307 However, there is mounting evidence that listings are made in bad faith (to 
block generic competition) and are not based on a reasonable, good faith belief that the 
patents listed are listable. As the FTC has noted “the Orange Book listing scheme is 
susceptible to opportunistic behavior” and brand-name companies (as NDA holder) 
frequently exploit the listing scheme by obtaining patents and listing them in order to 
block FDA approvals of generic rivals when the NDA holder does not reasonably expect 
the patents to ultimately hold up in court.308
C. Conclusion
The goal of this section was to highlight how a law enacted in part to stimulate 
generic competition and thereby expand consumer access to cheaper alternative life-
saving drugs has been hijacked by brand-name drug manufacturers, sometimes in 
collusion with generic drug manufacturers. Brand-name drug companies have 
traditionally been viewed with suspicion. However, as the case studies highlight, generic 
drug companies are no saints either. Given the proper incentive, some generic drug 
companies may be willing to delay or disrupt competition and keep drug prices 
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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artificially high. Collusion between the generic companies is also possible and is 
increasingly the focus of FTC enforcement actions. The FTC has identified two 
potentially competition-reducing categories of agreements that merit the agencies close 
attention.309
It is disheartening that drug manufacturers can brazenly engage in fraudulent, 
anticompetitive practices in a country like the United States with state-of-the-art antitrust 
laws, a plethora of consumer protection laws, a sound judicial system that provides 
avenues for those harmed to seek recourse, and a strong public regulatory and 
enforcement agency such as the FTC able to monitor the activities of the companies 
concerned. None of these mechanisms are readily available at the global level. There is at 
present nothing to stop a pharmaceutical company intent on exploiting loop-holes in the 
Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation to delay generic 
competition.    
In theory, the combined effect of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration 
and the 2003 Decision on Implementation will be that developing countries will have 
more opportunities to obtain essential pharmaceutical products at reduced prices.310
309 Prepared Statement of the FTC 2002, supra note 264. The first are agreements that involve exclusive 
distributorship arrangements. Under such an arrangement, a second generic entrant, rather than bringing a 
competing product to market, might agree to become the exclusive distributor of the first entrant. 
Essentially, such an arrangement guarantees the second entrant an agreed-upon share of the market. In 
return the first entrant is against aggressive price competition. The second category of agreements involves 
division of market segments. Under such an arrangement, the first generic entrant might agree to market its 
product exclusively in one market, while the second entrant agrees to market its product exclusively in 
another. The overall objective of such agreements is to impede vigorous competition.
310 Countries facing health emergencies can: (i) acquire needed medicine directly from brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies; (ii) acquire patented drugs through parallel marketing channels; (iii) ensure 
availability of generics through compulsory licensing that enables local manufacture; and (iv) procure 
generics from another country through the compulsory licensing scheme established under the 2003 
Decision on Implementation; (v) acquire generic products from licensees of brand-name companies in 
situations where the company has voluntarily licensed its patent.
As hitherto explained, where the prices of pharmaceutical products are lower in a foreign market,  
parallel import permits a government to allow the importation of such products into the national market so 
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However, an examination of the nature and intensity of competition in the pharmaceutical 
sector in the U.S. suggests that abuse of patent rights is very rife in the industry and that 
in many instances brand-name pharmaceutical companies will deploy a host of abusive 
and anti-competitive practices in an effort to protect their market share and maximize 
their profit. A study of on-going litigation in U.S. courts and antitrust enforcement 
actions brought by the FTC, including both branded and generic drug manufacturers, 
indicates that generic drug companies are not paragons of virtue; given adequate 
incentive, some generic drug companies will engage in anti-competitive practices that 
ultimately hurt consumers. In the U.S., although the existence of a plethora of anti-trust 
and consumer protection legislation and the presence of the FTC has helped to keep 
abuses in the pharmaceutical industry to a bare minimum, companies are still finding 
ingenious ways to evade the law and the watchful eyes of the FTC.  The obvious lesson is 
that frequently, well-intended laws are not enough to ensure that medicine is available to 
those who need it most. 
With respect to the war over access to medicine in developing countries, 
therefore, I argue that despite the laudable goals of the Doha Declaration and the 2003 
Decision on Implementation, there are serious potentials for abuse in the industry.  These 
abuses could ultimately work to deprive the suffering men and women in the Third World 
of the intended benefit of the two texts. In other words, as attention moves away from the 
emotive issue of HIV/AIDS and attempts are made to use compulsory licensing to secure 
as to offer drugs at more affordable prices.  See Submission by the African Group, supra note 79, at para. 
26 (“For developing countries, in particular, least-developed countries and smaller economies, “parallel 
importation” can be a significant way of increasing access to medications, where the prices charged by 
patent holders for their products are unaffordable.  Moreover, in situations where the local manufacture of 
the product is not feasible, and therefore compulsory licences may be ineffective, parallel importation may 
be a relevant tool to ensure access to drugs.”).
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the manufacture of drugs needed to treat other diseases, pharmaceutical companies may 
be tempted to employ a host of abusive practices in an effort to safeguard their turf. 
I envisage at least six possible types of abuses. First, collusive agreements 
between brand-name companies and generic drug companies may begin to emerge; under 
these agreements, generic companies may agree to refrain from requesting compulsory 
license to manufacture generic versions of pharmaceutical products in return for payment 
or exclusive distribution arrangements. Second, collusive agreements between generic 
companies may also begin to emerge under which the companies agree to inflate prices 
and engage in other monopolistic practices. Third, abuses in the form of serious attempts 
by brand-name pharmaceutical companies to influence the decision of eligible importing 
and exporting countries may begin to emerge regarding whether and when to issue a 
compulsory license. Fourth, the world may begin to see abuses in the form of attempts by 
brand-name companies to delay or block generic competition altogether by challenging 
the bioequivalence of generic drugs. Fifth, brand-name companies may attempt to 
undermine the 2003 Decision on Implementation by persistently raising questions about 
whether exporting countries and manufacturers have satisfied all the requirements 
stipulated in the Decision, particularly requirements relating to safeguard and anti-
diversion.311 Sixth, although a remote possibility, companies may also engage in false 
marketing practices aimed at either confusing the general public about the safety of 
generic drugs or discouraging doctors from prescribing generic drugs. 
311
 Médecins Sans Frontières, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back? Issues for the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference (Cancun 2003), at 3, available at
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/Pre-CancunBriefing.pdf. The system may also be abused by 
governments. Pressure may be brought on developing countries to forgo their privilege under the Decision. 
Moreover, in the context of bilateral and regional trade negotiations, developed countries may push for 
tighter patent protection than is envisaged under TRIPS.
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Abusive practices of multinational companies can adversely affect the trading 
environment in developing countries and burden consumers with inflated prices for 
pharmaceutical products. In the United States, the Sherman Act has been particularly 
useful in addressing monopolistic practices in the pharmaceutical sector.  If and when 
pharmaceutical companies resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade and 
adversely impede prompt access to generic drugs, what laws are available to address 
these practices? Do developing countries and least-developed countries have the requisite 
legal and institutional capacity to deal with domestic and transborder anticompetitive 
practices? Are there global trade rules that address potential abuses of patents by right 
holders? Is there a need for a multilateral agreement on competition? Should such an 
agreement be developed within the framework of the WTO? Will the development of 
such rules be in the overall interest of developing countries? 
The questions are pertinent because the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision 
on Implementation cannot in and of themselves prevent the abuse of patent rights by drug 
companies. These questions will be briefly addressed in Section VI. As will be seen, 
many developing countries currently lack the necessary legislation and/or enforcement 
powers to deal with abusive practices of transnational corporations, and are thus among 
the most vulnerable to the effects of anti-competitive activities of international cartels. At 
first glance, therefore, a multilateral rule on competition would appear to be in the 
interest of developing companies. A multilateral framework on competition policy could 
ensure that developing countries have the capacity and tools to deter and remedy anti-
competitive practices.  Paradoxically, developing countries have resisted efforts to 
negotiate a global competition rule within the framework of the WTO. 
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VI. BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE BLUE SEA:
IS A GLOBAL COMPETITION RULE THE ANSWER?
In this section, I examine existing global trade rules that address anti-competitive 
behavior in the pharmaceutical sector, evaluate current efforts towards the development 
of a global competition rule within the framework of the WTO, and highlight the special 
concerns of developing countries regarding these initiatives. 
A.  The Treatment of Abusive and Antitrust Practices under the TRIPS Agreement
Several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement address anti-competitive practices by 
private actors.312 Article 8(2) stipulates that: “[a]ppropriate measures, provided that they 
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse 
of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.”313 In granting compulsory license under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
to remedy an adjudicated violation of competition, a WTO Member may ignore some of 
the conditions stipulated in the Agreement that are intended to safeguard the interests of 
the patent holder.314 Furthermore, in determining the amount of remuneration to be paid 
312 MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 65 (observing that during negotiations for the TRIPS Agreement, 
developing countries pushed for the inclusion of anti-competitive measures).
313 Id. at 65 (noting that article 8(2) is broad and is designed to address the abuse of contractual licensing 
agreements.).
314Article 31(k) exempts Members from applying the conditions in subparagraphs (b) and (f) “where such 
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive.”
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain 
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts 
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.  This requirement may be waived by a 
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in such cases “[t]he need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into 
account.”315
Concerned that patent holders may attempt to impose anti-competitive provisions 
in contractual licensing agreements, Article 40(2) allows WTO Members to specify in 
their legislation “licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute 
an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the 
relevant market.”  Members may also “adopt, consistently with the other provisions of 
[the TRIPS Agreement], appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which 
may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing 
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and 
regulations of that Member.”316 Article 40 also establishes a mechanism for 
extraterritorial investigation and enforcement and creates conditions for cooperation 
through the supply of necessary information.317
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
public non-commercial use.  In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable.  In the case of 
public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or 
has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right 
holder shall be informed promptly;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use;
315
 Article 31(f) of TRIPS Agreement.
316
 Article 40(2). A WTO Member who has cause to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is 
a national or domiciliary of another WTO Member is undertaking practices in violation of the its laws and 
regulations, and which wishes to secure compliance with such legislation, may request for consultations 
with the Member whose national is in violation. Article 40(3) stipulates that each Member to whom a 
request for consultation has been directed, “shall enter, upon request, into consultations” with the State 
requesting the consultation. It also provides that “[t]he Member addressed shall accord full and sympathetic 
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for, consultations with the requesting Member, and 
shall cooperate through supply of publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to the matter 
in question and of other information available to the Member, subject to domestic law and to the conclusion 
of mutually satisfactory agreements concerning the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting 
Member.”
317 MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at  65.
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The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement give some room for WTO Members to 
address patent abuses and anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector. One of 
the primary mechanisms envisaged in the TRIPS agreement for dealing with anti-
competitive practices is compulsory licensing. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not 
fully deal with problems that could potentially arise after a compulsory license has been 
issued, that is, practices that operate to delay or suppress the entry of generic competition 
even after a compulsory license has been issued. Furthermore, a measure of legal and 
institutional sophistication is required to effectively utilize the existing provisions of the 
agreement – something that many developing countries currently lack.
B. Is a Global Competition Rule Necessary?
In the last twenty years there has been a growing call for the development of 
multilateral rules on anti-competitive practices.318 The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade did not provide binding rules on restrictive business practices with the result that to 
date, efforts to establish global rules to deal with restrictive business practices have only 
resulted in non-binding codes of conduct.319 In 1995, the then WTO Director-General, 
Renato Ruggiero, observed that there was “an urgent need for a dispassionate analysis at 
the multilateral level of the overall links between competition policy and trade policy, 
318
 Bernard Hoekman, Competition Policy and the Global Trading System: A Developing Country 
Perspective (World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 1755), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/org/research/trade/pdf/wp175.pdf (observing that starting in the late 1980s an 
increasing number of academics and policy makers began calling for the development of multilateral rules 
on  anticompetitive practices).
319 Id.
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notably to identify the problems that may require action and the options for such 
action.”320 The EU communication of June 1996 put competition squarely on the 
international agenda.321
 Until then, the work in the WTO on competition policy had largely taken the 
form of responses to specific trade policy issues, rather than a look at the broad picture.322
At the first regular biennial meeting of the WTO at the Ministerial level in 1996 in 
Singapore,323 Trade Ministers reached an agreement to establish a WTO Working Group 
on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (“WGTCP”) to look more 
generally at the relationships between trade and competition policies.324 Trade ministers 
also agreed to establish a working group on trade and investment.325 The task of the 
WGTCP was merely analytical and exploratory.326 The WGTCP was authorized only “to 
320
 World Trade Organization, Economic globalization increases impact of national competition policies on 
International Trade- says Renato Ruggiero, Press Release of November 20, 1995, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres95_e/rome1.htm.
321
 Karel Van Miert, The WTO and Competition Policy: the Need to Consider Negotiations, Address Before 
Ambassadors to the WTO in Geneva, April 21, 1998; available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ 
speeches/text/sp1998_038_en.html.
322
 World Trade Organization, Competition Policy, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
comp_e/comp_e.htm.
323
 Trade Ministers met in Singapore from December 9-13, 1996 for  a Ministerial Conference as mandated 
by Article IV of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
324
 World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on December 13, 1996, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/wtodec.htm.  Since 1997, the WGTCP has 
reported annually to the General Council.  See World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Group on 
the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/7 (July 17, 
2003) [hereinafter 2003 Report of the WGTCP]. For the Working Group's previous reports on its activities 
see:  in 1997 (WT/WGTCP/1), 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2), 1999 (WT/WGTCP/3), 2000 (WT/WGTCP/4), 2001 
(WT/WGTCP/5) and 2002 (WT/WGTCP/6), available at http://docsonline.wto.org.  In the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration, ministers agreed to “establish a working group to study issues raised by Members 
relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in 
order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework.” See supra.
325 Id. at para. 20 (“we also agree to … establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade 
and investment.”).
326
  It was agreed that the Working Group will not negotiate new rules or commitments and that future 
negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in the area of trade and competition policy “will take 
place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members regarding such 
negotiations.” Id.
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study” the interaction between trade and competition policy.327  The General Council was 
mandated to keep the work of the WGTCP under review, and to determine after two 
years how its work should proceed. In 2001, the mandate of the WGTCP was 
extended.328
Since 1996, the efforts of the EU and countries like Japan to move the agenda 
towards negotiations on a multilateral framework of competition rules have been largely 
unsuccessful.329  While some members call for a multilateral agreement on competition 
policy, others strongly oppose the idea.330 Although there appears to be a consensus 
among WTO Members on the need to address transborder anti-competitive practices, 
there is a divergence of opinion on how this problem should be addressed. Discussions in 
the WGTCP have revolved around some core topics that reflect areas where intense study 
and further discussions are still needed. In the ensuing section, I will discuss three related 
issues: (i) the pros and cons of a multilateral agreement on competition; (ii) the structure 
of any proposed framework and the need of such framework to reflect traditional WTO 
principles such as the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and procedural 
fairness; and (iii) the elements of progressivity and flexibility that should be included in 
any multilateral framework on competition policy to be adopted together with questions 
327 Id.
328
 The Doha Declaration mandated that negotiations on a global competition rule could start after the 2003 
Cancún Ministerial Conference, “on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that 
session on modalities of negotiations.”  See supra note 9, at para. 20.
329
 In 1999 Japan called for a global agreement on competition.  See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference on Trade and Competition (“Members 
should agree to put the item of competition law and policy on the agenda of the next WTO negotiations
with a view to: establishing a competition regime for each Member; ensuring effective enforcement in 
order to properly address anti-competitive practices; and promoting international cooperation in this 
area.”),  available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wto/min99/t -compe.html. 
330
 World Trade Organization, Trade and Competition Policy http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
inist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/16comp_e.htm (noting that “a number of Members have renewed the call 
for a WTO framework to support the implementation of effective national competition policies by 
Members and enhance the overall contribution of competition policy to the multilateral trading system 
while other Members have expressed continuing objections to negotiations on this matter.”). 
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relating to technical assistance, capacity building and special and differential agreement 
for developing countries.
1. The Pros and Cons of a Multilateral Rule: Several arguments are
frequently advanced to support the call for a multilateral rule on competition including 
the difficulty of individual countries effectively addressing transborder restrictive 
practices and the need for a more comprehensive, consistent and coherent approach to 
anti-competitive practices in the global market place instead of the current case-by- case 
approach to transborder restrictive practices,331 the need to ensure that the gains from 
liberalization are not undermined by anti-competitive behavior of private actors,332 and 
the belief that “an international framework of competition rules would contribute to the 
development of international trade” by removing barriers to access to markets.333  It is 
331 Id. (“In today’s global economy, there are numerous anti-competitive practices which have an 
international dimension and which therefore come under the jurisdiction of different competition 
authorities. This may result in conflicts of law and jurisdiction and might make it difficult for competition 
agencies to deal with transborder restrictive practices.”).
332 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para. 14 (“Experience had shown that liberalizing trade 
and encouraging foreign direct investment heightened the dangers posed by anti-competitive practices such 
as cartels.  A multilateral framework would reinforce the application of competition law and policy at the 
national level and thereby strengthen Members’ ability to address these challenges.”).
333 Id. (“There is also a general consensus that competition policy is a key factor in supporting the 
competitiveness of industry, in protecting a sound functioning of the economy, and in maximising 
consumer welfare.”).  
According to Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, in a speech 
delivered at Harvard University in 1996:
“But if we have succeeded in getting the rules of competition between countries to work 
effectively, that very success requires us to go further and consider how the behaviour of 
companies can serve to distort international competition. We will need to see whether 
there are any areas where explicit competition rules, or specific understandings, are 
necessary internationally to complement the statutes that many governments already have 
on their books. I have no doubt that competition rules are essential to the proper 
functioning of markets - what we need to clarify, however, is how best to promote such 
disciplines, both nationally and internationally.”
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also argued that the development of a multilateral agreement on competition policy 
would “act as an impetus towards building a culture of competition;”334 “encourage 
countries without a competition policy to adopt one;”335 and “ensure that progress made 
through previous trade and investment liberalization initiatives at multi-lateral, regional 
and bilateral levels, is not negated by private anti-competitive activities.”336 These 
arguments are aptly summed up in the 2003 report of the WGTCP. According to this 
report:
A multilateral framework on competition policy would establish a 
coherent set of principles for sound competition policy among all 
Members, without imposing a harmonized approach, and would promote a 
more transparent and predictable climate to encourage foreign trade and 
investment.  It would also contribute to the building of institutional 
capacity in developing countries, and would assist Members lacking a 
competition law in drafting an appropriate law and establishing an 
enforcement authority.  Cooperation in the context of a multilateral 
framework offered the prospect of shortening the time frames that 
developing countries would need to build and embed competition laws and 
policies that would support their development goals; a key consideration 
in this regard was the more supportive environment it would provide for 
better-targeted assistance and capacity building.  Finally, an agreement 
would encourage beneficial cooperation among Members which was 
important given the increasing prevalence of cross-border anti-competitive 
activities.337
While acknowledging the need for a global rule on competition,338 developing 
Renato Ruggiero, Director-General, World Trade Organization, The Global Challenge:  Opportunities and 
Choices in the Multilateral Trading System, The Fourteenth Paul-Henri Spaak Lecture, Harvard University, 
October 16, 1995, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres95_e/pr025_e.htm.
334
 Competition Bureau, Consultations on the Competition Bureau’s Paper “Options for the 
Internationalization of Competition Policy” – Increased International Cooperation on Competition Policy,
available at http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/vwGeneratedInterE/ct02112e.html.  The 
Competition Bureau is an agency of the Canadian Government  responsible for maintaining and 
encouraging fair competition in Canada.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337
 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para. 13.
338
 Id. at para. 18 (“Most developing countries now acknowledged the need to implement a national 
competition law or policy, out of their own self-interest.”). See also World Trade Organization, Working 
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countries are reticent about the development of such a framework.339 There are several 
reasons for this.  First, for many poor countries, competition policy is overshadowed by 
higher priorities.340 Second, developing countries are afraid that a multilateral framework 
may not “allow for the preservation of policy space in regard to developmental 
objectives.”341 Third, developing countries are very worried about the direct financial 
cost associated with implementation of such a framework.342 Fourth, apart from the 
financial implications of implementing a global competition rule, developing countries 
are also concerned about additional difficulties that could arise as a result of “disparities 
between countries and/or their firms in respect of levels of development and 
competitiveness, experience in the adoption or implementation of competition laws and 
the capacity to implement such legislation.”343 Fifth, some countries are concerned about 
the potential scope of any proposed framework in terms of the types of abusive practices 
that would be addressed and the place of existing WTO principles of transparency, non-
discrimination and procedural fairness in any proposed multilateral framework on 
competition policy.344 Finally, developing countries also fear that a multilateral
agreement on competition would be used as a pretext to open markets for Northern-based 
Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from Malaysia, 
WT/WGTCP/W/239, July 24, 2003 (“Malaysia acknowledges that a competition policy seeks to ensure 
efficiency in the market place.  There is growing awareness on the need to develop some kind of regulatory 
control on anti-competitive conduct of firms and multinational companies as the existence of such practices 
have unnecessarily burdened consumers with not only inflated prices for goods and services but have also 
adversely affected the trading environment.  Concerted efforts need to be undertaken to counter their 
effects on developing countries. ”), available at http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter Communication from 
Malaysia]. 
339
 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para, 17.
340 Id.
341
 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
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corporations rather than address the anti-competitive behavior of multinational 
corporations and their impediments to development.345
2. Structure of a Potential Multilateral Framework:
What would be the structure of a potential multilateral framework in terms of the 
breadth and depth of possible obligations that members will be expected to assume? Will 
harmonization of national competition laws be an objective of the framework? What core 
principles would be integrated into the framework? Would there be sufficient flexibility 
built into the framework taking into account the differences in the situation of WTO 
Members? These questions are pertinent because paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration –
the paragraph that extended the mandate of the WGTCP –  specifically calls attention to 
them.346
Discussions in the Working Group indicate that there is a general consensus that
hardcore cartels must be addressed in any proposed future rule. Developing countries 
welcome this focus.347 Hardcore cartels have been described as “the most unambiguously 
345
 Martin Khor, Director of Third World Network, WTO competition rules is just Global "welfare" for 
TNCs, http://www.twnside.org.sg/ title/welf-cn.htm.
346
 Paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration reads:
25. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy will focus on the clarification of:  core 
principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and 
provisions on hard core cartels;  modalities for voluntary cooperation;  and support for 
progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through 
capacity-building….
347 Communication from Malaysia, supra note 338, at 2 (“There should be no place for hardcore cartels in 
any country, irrespective of its level of economic development.  Thus, it would be more appropriate for the 
Working Group to concentrate its efforts on discussing anti-competitive practices particularly those related 
to hardcore cartels.”).
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harmful of competition law violations.”348 Hardcore cartels are bad because they impose
heavy costs on the economies of countries, particularly countries that lack effective tools 
to deal with them.349 Although discussions at the WGTCP suggest that there is a growing 
consensus that hardcore cartels should be addressed, there is currently, no generally 
accepted definition of a hardcore cartel. There is therefore a need for a clearer definition 
of hardcore cartels and further discussions on what approach should be adopted in 
dealing with them.
The possible inclusion of WTO principles of non-discrimination, transparency 
and procedural fairness into any proposed framework is a major concern for some 
developing countries and civil society organization. For example, Malaysia expressed the 
concern that transparency requirements may be used to impose additional burdens on 
developing countries.350 Kenya has questioned the wisdom of universalizing principles 
developed in the context of trade policy.351 Martin Khor, Director of Third World 
Network, argues that increasing advocacy by Northern governments for application of the 
principles of non-discrimination, national treatment and transparency reflect a hidden 
agenda to give foreign corporations, whether as suppliers through exports or by local 
investments and franchising, equal – if not better –  treatment than that given to local 
enterprises.352
348
  2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para, 41.
349 Id. at para. 41. (noting also that hardcore cartels raise prices, restrict the supply of essential goods, and 
can have the effect of impeding the transfer of technology to developing countries).
350 Communication from Malaysia, supra note 338, at 1.
351
 World Trade Organization, Working Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
Communication from Kenya, WT/WGTCP/W/238, July 24, 2003 (“The so-called core principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness were developed in the context of trade policy and 
they were not intended as universal principles applicable to all issues including competition policy.  It is 
not self-evident that it is appropriate or desirable to apply these principles to competition policy.”), 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter Communication from Kenya]. 
352 Khor, supra note 245.
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3. Flexibilities, Progressivity, Technical Assistance, Capacity Building and 
Special and Differential Treatment
The adoption of a multilateral framework on competition policy would also 
undoubtedly involve heavy administrative burdens for many developing countries, 
particularly countries that currently lack competition legislation and institutions.353
Consequently, appropriate flexibility and progressivity elements “supported by 
continuing commitments with regard to technical assistance and capacity building”354
would be necessary.  It is also important that any multilateral framework on competition 
policy “take cognisance of, and accommodate, a substantial degree of pluralism in 
national competition policies, especially among developing countries, in addition to 
other, sometimes more interventionist, policies that existed to support development.”355
For many countries, the startup process would be beset by numerous financial and 
administrative problems;356 some countries will need technical assistance in establishing 
an effective regime. It is therefore important that provisions relating to technical 
assistance and capacity building be fully fleshed out.357
353
 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para, 18 (noting that implementing a global rule on 
competition could “pose significant difficulties for countries that currently lack a domestic competition law 
and/or policy.”).
354 Id. at para. 16.
355 Id. at para. 18.
356 Communication from Malaysia, supra note 338, at 1 (noting that capacity constraints abound as both the 
government and private sectors are confronted with the prospect of a new business environment and 
pointing to the need for the international community to continue to focus and prioritize on providing 
technical assistance to developing countries).
357 While there appears to be a general willingness to provide assistance to countries that need it, 
developing countries may be forgiven for not taken the promises of assistance seriously. Promises of better-
targeted assistance and capacity building in other agreements including the TRIPS Agreements are yet to 
materialize.
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C. Conclusion
Competition laws and policies are necessary both for the overall wellbeing of an 
economy and for the protection of consumers. In general, effective competition law and 
policy help ensure efficiency in the marketplace and a robust competitive environment. 
Arguably, a multilateral rule on competition could be in the interest of developing 
countries.358 A global competition rule could contribute to the development of 
institutional capacity in developing countries, assist developing countries currently 
lacking competition law in drafting appropriate legislation, and encourage beneficial 
cooperation among WTO Members. Such a multilateral framework could strengthen the 
ability of developing countries to address dangerous anti-competitive practices in the 
pharmaceutical sector and in other sectors.
However, given a myriad of socio-economic problems and developmental 
objectives, negotiations on competition law-related matters may not be a priority for 
many developing countries. In the context of limited resources and growing obligations 
under a host of international trade agreements, the resources of many developing 
countries may be better directed at more important socio-economic policies.359 In 
addressing anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector, developing countries 
358
 WATAL, supra note 15, at 374 (noting that international cooperation in the breaking-up of cartels of 
multinationals could be in the interest of developing countries).
359 Communication from Malaysia, supra note 338, at 2 (“At this point of time, we feel that negotiations on 
competition law-related matters are not part of the Doha work programme.  Domestic competition 
policy/law may not be a major consideration for developing countries.  National priorities and limited 
capacity may require that scarce resources are allocated for the implementation of more important socio-
economic development policies in the country.  Alternative domestic approaches to enhance competition in 
the form of regulatory reform are some of the measures being undertaken.”).
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may be content to simply utilize the tools presently available under the TRIPS 
Agreement.360
Some of the fears expressed by developing countries regarding any proposed 
agreement on competition policy are not overstated.361 Whether a global competition rule 
will be in the interest of developing countries will depend on the extent to which the 
interests of developing countries are fully reflected in any future agreement. It is 
important that any proposed multilateral framework does not simply become a 
smokescreen for promoting market access for transnational corporations and imposing on 
developing countries, anti-trust laws of more developed WTO Members. One of the 
purposes of any future multilateral agreement on competition should therefore be to 
address the challenges currently faced by developing countries, for example through a 
focus on those anticompetitive practices that developing countries are most vulnerable to. 
Firm and effective commitments regarding capacity building, technical assistance and 
special and differential treatment provisions would also be necessary. 
360
 WATAL, supra note15, at 374 (“[G]iven the freedom presently available under TRIPS on competition 
policy in general and compulsory license in particular, it may not be prudent to enter the stage of 
negotiation.”).
361
 Proponents of a multilateral agreement on competition are of the view that the fears of developing 
countries are overstated; these fears some argue, could be addressed by the inclusion of transitional periods 
and flexibility in the rules.  According to Mr. Karel Van Miert,
The developing countries may have most to gain from an international framework of 
competition rules. On the one hand, they would be able to benefit from the multilateral 
framework right away - by enabling requests for co-operation to combat anti-competitive 
business practices and by providing for technical assistance regarding the setting up of 
domestic competition structures. On the other hand, one could envisage transitional 
periods in the multilateral framework designed to meet certain specific problems of 
developing economies.
See Van Miert, supra note 321.
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Although important, it is not enough that harmonization will not be the goal of 
any proposed framework.362 While there are convincing arguments for why a multilateral 
framework on competition policy may be in the interest of developing countries, there is 
a strong need to take into account a country’s level of development when formulating 
such an agreement and establishing obligations regarding implementation. Paragraph 25 
of the Doha Declaration buttresses this fact by stating that in discussions on the 
modalities for a potential multilateral framework, “[f]ull account shall be taken of the 
needs of developing and least-developed country participants and appropriate flexibility 
provided to address them.”363
Overall, should a multilateral framework on competition be negotiated, there 
would be a need to consider (i) the different levels of development and economic 
circumstances of WTO Members; (ii) the different legal, social, and cultural context of 
Members; (iii) the difference in availability of resources for implementing the terms of 
any proposed framework; and (iv) the different levels of institutional development and 
the fact that Members have different administrative systems.364 Thus, rather than attempt 
to impose a one-size-fits-all standard, as is the case with the TRIPS Agreement, a 
proposed set of principles that “would embody common values and promote cooperative 
approaches to competition law enforcement” would be a useful starting point.365 In the 
final analysis, it may be important to “preserve the right of a country to choose whether 
362 Id. (“It is likely that any agreement in the WTO on competition would not match the level of 
competition policy and instruments achieved by countries, which have decades of experience in antitrust 
activities. But is this really a problem? We are not talking about replacing national law by international 
rules.”).
363
 Doha Declaration, supra note 9.
364 Khor, supra note 245.
365
 2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para 16.
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and when to have a competition law and the kind of competition policy to adopt.”366
VII. CONCLUSION
To a great extent, the war over access to medicine in developing countries was 
unnecessary because the TRIPS Agreement appeared to provide sufficient policy spaces 
aimed at attenuating the potential adverse effects of a strong intellectual property regime. 
The war was inevitable, however, given the numerous ambiguities that existed in the 
TRIPS Agreement, the negotiating history of TRIPS Agreement,367 and the 
understandable efforts by the pharmaceutical industry to safeguard their profit margins 
using every means possible. The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated at a time when the 
impact of a strong patent protection was not widely understood in the developing world 
and at a time when the debate on the necessity of a global intellectual property regime 
was dominated by global corporate actors and countries with intellectual property 
expertise.368  Today, not only is the relationship between patent protection and economic 
growth more understood, new actors “whose views were peripheral in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations have now entered the debate on global intellectual property 
protection more wholeheartedly.”369
366 See Communication from Kenya, supra note 351 (also observing that countries should preserve the right 
to adopt a phased approach in terms of discussion, implementation and enforcement of a competition law 
because only then can countries adopts competition regimes that support their industrial policy).
367
 WATAL, supra note 15, at 382. During the negotiations there was intense pressure on developing 
countries to accept stronger obligations relating to the protection of intellectual property rights. Not 
surprising, “[f]rom the outset, the TRIPS agreement has been controversial.” Pascal Lamy, Commissioner 
of the European Commission, International Trade in Drugs: Its Role in Equitable Development, Speech to 
the Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Managers, March 21, 2003, available at http://www.europa. 
eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla162_en.htm [hereinafter International Trade in 
Drugs].
368 OSTERGARD, JR., supra note 4, at (noting that debate was dominated by countries “with a negotiating 
advantage over developing countries in terms of intellectual property expertise.”).
369 Id.
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The battles over the precise relationship between patent rights, public health and 
state sovereignty reflect the simultaneous convergence of a number of trends that together 
define the emerging world of the twenty-first century including: the growing convergence 
of national economic systems, widening disparities of income and development, the rise 
in the power and influence of transnational corporations and the explosion of diseases 
that transcend national boundaries.370 In the twenty-first century, drugs matter because of 
their role in equitable and sustainable development and because many developing 
countries have little or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector371 and 
have little resources to devote to R&D in essential medicine.372 Also, in the twenty-first 
century, as a result of globalization, transnational corporations in general and 
pharmaceutical companies in particular are having to assume new global responsibility 
that they did not have before. 
Compulsory license gives developing countries tools to address serious health 
problems by enabling them to obtain generic drugs at an affordable price.373 Although an 
important instrument in efforts to protect public health, compulsory licenses alone “will 
370 See International Trade in Drugs, supra note 367 (of the trends in the twenty-first century, Pascal Lamy 
notes, “widening disparities of development, global interdependency of trade movements, acceleration of 
technological progress which only benefits a minority, the explosion of a deadly disease known as AIDS, 
the emergence of global civil society, and the inadequacies of national and international governance 
systems.”).
371 Id. (noting that little medical and pharmaceutical research is carried on in developing countries and that 
developing countries have next to no facilities for the manufacture of drugs). 
372 Id. (“The gap between North and South is a veritable chasm when it comes to drugs. According to the 
WHO, developing countries are home to 76% of the world’s population, but account for only 20% of world 
drug consumption. Not only that, but their share has been declining! (In 1976, they represented 24% of 
world consumption)). 
373 Id. (It is not our aim to encourage the widespread granting of compulsory licences by the developing 
countries. But it is clear that in negotiations with the major pharmaceutical groups, whose revenues often 
far exceed those countries’ GDP, the fact that the developing countries have the compulsory licence option 
to fall back on can give them the leverage they need to secure lower prices. In this way, compulsory 
licensing can operate as an effective form of deterrence.”).
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not address all the problems related to public health.”374 This is because there are many 
other factors that influence access to medicine in developing countries including: level of 
research and development; quality of diagnosis; capacities of health systems and budget; 
the quality of drugs; and adequacy of health care professionals.375 Given the multiplicity 
of factors that influence access to medicine, a combination of policies is needed to ensure 
that drug prices are lowered on a sustainable basis.376
The different battles may be over but the war against diseases in developing 
countries continues. For one thing, it is not clear yet whether developing countries will 
actually maximize the political space now afforded by the Doha Declaration and the 2003 
Decision on Implementation. Furthermore, experts rightly note that “[e]ven with newly 
discounted price for patented anti-retroviral drugs and even with dramatically cheaper 
equivalents from generic producers, developing countries and their private citizens will 
find it impossible to buy significant quantities of life-saving AIDS medicines without 
significant and sustained support from the international community.”377 To date, 
multilateral funding for AIDS treatment has been very poor; very little has changed since 
the establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the 
374 Submission by the African Group, supra note 79, at para. 28.
375 International Trade in Drugs, supra note 367 (noting a host of factors that account for the gap between 
North and South when it comes to drugs. These include, “the near total lack of social security and health 
insurance systems in the South, inadequate and badly-organised infrastructure, poor hygiene, badly 
educated and trained staff, and the failure to implement certain disease-prevention measures. The 
underlying problem is thus the same as for other forms of under-development: a crying deficiency of 
governance and public policy.”).
376
 Médecins Sans Frontières, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, What is the Campaign?
(suggesting a host of strategies including: encouraging generic competition, voluntary discounts on branded 
drugs, global procurement, and local production), available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org 
/campaign/campaign.shtm [hereinafter What is the Campaign?].
377
 Brook K. Baker, Health GAP, The Global Fund to Treat AIDS, TB, and Malaria: Fulfiling or Betraying 
the Promise of Treatment,  (July 7, 2002) (noting that during most of the 1990’s, “the actual per person 
expenditure on all AIDS prevention and treatment programs in Africa dropped to as little as $3 per person 
per year.”).
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“Global Fund”) in 2001. The Global Fund suffers from serious under-funding.378 Most 
important, given the possibilities of abuse in the pharmaceutical industry, the future will 
depend on the type of rules that exist to address abusive and anticompetitive practices by 
drug companies, the extent of self-regulation that exists in the industry, the role of ethical 
codes of conduct in the industry, and the extent to which external pressures can be 
brought to bear on the pharmaceutical industry. In this respect, actors such as civil society 
groups have a pivotal role to play in any effort to address the growing global influence of 
transnational pharmaceutical industry, raise awareness about any abuses in the industry 
and provide countries with timely information that will be needed to address abuses if 
and when they arise.
Just as many factors influence access to effective medicine, “many actors have a 
role to play in addressing the access crisis.”379 At the local and national level, 
governments clearly “have the responsibility to give priority to public health through 
strong, pro-health legislation.”380 Attention must now turn to other issues affecting access 
such as inadequacies in the health infrastructure of many developing countries.381  Unless 
these issues are addressed, many in the developing world will remain without access to 
essential drugs even if the drugs are offered at extremely low cost or for free.382
378 Id. On April 28, 2001, United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, called for the establishment of 
the Global Funds to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  Id. Annan estimated that an initial response to 
AIDS  would cost between $7 and $10 billion dollars per year. Id. Although the Global Funds was 
established, as of mid-May 2002, the Global Fund was funded at $1.9 billion of which only $725 million 
was available for spending in the year 2002. Id.
379 What is the Campaign?, supra note 376, at 2.
380 Id.
381
 International Council of AIDS Service Organizations, The International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and 
Human Rights: An Assessment of National Responses in Improving Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment Within 
the Framework  (2002) (observing that the public profile of the global drug pricing issue has been raised 
but less attention has been paid to other issues affecting access to treatment).  
382
 Adding Infrastructure to the Advocacy Agenda, supra note --, at iv (observing that there are examples of 
countries were drugs have been offered at extremely low prices but access to treatment has not increased 
for people living with HIV).  
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At the international level, organizations such as the World Health Organization, World 
Bank and UNAIDS must “adopt and advocate for policies that give the highest level of 
protection for public health.”383 Alongside continuing efforts to reduce the cost of 
medicine through generic competition, concurrent research and advocacy on additional
barriers to access is called for.384 Renewed commitment to support the United Nations 
Global Funds to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis is also called for. 
The private sector remains very important. Pharmaceutical companies can 
contribute to long-term solutions by cutting their prices for developing countries in a 
transparent and predictable way.385 Differential pricing thus remains a viable option.386
International donors and foundations remain very important also. In addition to funding 
disease prevention, international donors can fund drug purchase and other treatment 
programs.387 Finally, civil society groups have a continuing responsibility to monitor and 
hold accountable all the important players –  states, international donors, pharmaceutical 
companies –  and to expose abuses and other failures when they occur.
It is important that the integrity of the patent system is preserved through good 
faith use of the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation. The patent 
system is needed to finance new research and development and ensure that drug 
manufacturers continue to bring newer and better drugs to the market. However, studies 
in the U.S. and elsewhere show that the industry’s emphasis on R&D is somewhat 
exaggerated. Data gathered by Families USA, does show that in the U.S. at least, major 
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Id.
386
 Differential pricing allows the pharmaceutical industry to provide drugs to the poorest countries at 
significantly reduced prices.
387 Id.
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pharmaceutical companies “spend significantly more on marketing, advertising, and 
administration than they spend on R&D.”388
The access to treatment debate unearthed many hidden factors that impede access 
to essential drugs for millions in the developing world.389 In addition to increasing access 
to essential drugs in developing countries, the debate brought the human rights to health 
back into the spotlight.390 The access to treatment debate raised interesting questions 
about how to balance ethical concerns and economic concerns.391 Public health is an 
ethical and human rights issue, but does it necessarily trump substantial economic and 
other public interests at stake when patent rights are implicated?392 What constraints 
should society impose on the rights of a patent holder? Can the pharmaceutical industry 
be trusted to develop sound ethical principles to guide the activities of its members? 
These questions and more will continue to resonate many years from now.
388
 Families USA, Profiting From Pain: Where Prescription Drug Dollars Go 1 (July 2002), available at
http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/PPreport.pdf?docID=249 [hereinafter Families USA, Profiting 
From Pain].  In its study of nine U.S. pharmaceutical companies that manufacture or market the 50 top-
selling drugs for seniors, Families USA found that on average, the companies spend 11 percent of revenue 
on R&D and 27 percent on marketing, advertising, and administration.  Id. at 5.  The study found that “[n]o 
company spent as much as 20 percent of revenue on R&D, whereas every company except Merck spent 
more than 20 percent of revenue on marketing, advertising, and administration.” Id. Finally, the report 
found that the pharmaceutical industry was very generous to its top executives with the result that “[t]he 10 
highest-paid executives across the nine companies received a total of $236 million in compensation in 
2001, exclusive of unexercised stock options.”  Id. at 7 (emhasis in original). 
389
 In the case of  HIV/AIDS, barriers to accessing treatment take many forms, including drug costs, stigma 
and discrimination, political denial and disinterest and general lack of healthcare infrastructure. See
generally,  International Council of AIDS Service Organizations, Adding Infrastructure to the Advocacy 
Agenda (2002).
390
 International Council of AIDS Service Organizations, The International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and 
Human Rights: An Assessment of National Responses in Improving Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment Within 
the Framework 8 (2002) (arguing that access to medical treatment of HIV infection is crucial for the 
respect of the right to health and the right to life). Essentially some local and global NGO’s, drawing on 
some human rights treaties, argued that access to treatment was a human right issue. The efforts of this 
organization led to the adoption of the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS by the Second International 
Consultation on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, held in Geneva, Switzerland in September of 1996. See id.
at 1.
391 International Trade in Drugs, supra note 367 (observing that although public health is an ethical issue, 
there are other economic interests at stake).
392 Id. (“There is nothing to be gained by constructing a false opposition between intellectual property, 
which is essential if we are to have the innovation we need to produce new drugs, and access to care; 
instead, we should seek ways to make them work together.”).
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